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EDITORIAL

CATHOLIC AND ROMAN CATHOLIC

When Father Vernon's secession to Rome was announced in the early autumn of last year, it was the occasion of widespread regret, since he had proved himself one of the most effective Mission preachers of our day. The event has proved, however, a blessing in disguise; for it has served to bring matters to a head and to clear up a situation which had been let drift for too long. Father Vernon's *apologia* has shown itself a veritable boomerang; and in *One God and Father of All** Mr. Milner-White and Mr. Wilfred Knox, of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd in Cambridge, have put out a book which, despite its modest size and price, is of far more than personal or ephemeral significance. The Roman controversy is here lifted out of the sphere of personalities on to that of principles; Roman claims are subjected to a fearless analysis at the bar of scholarship and reason; and the Church of Rome is given its proper place as a sister Church of Constantinople and of Canterbury. We propose to consider the bearing of this book, first, on the immediate issue with which it deals; secondly, on the meaning of Catholicism and Catholic unity; and, thirdly, on the position in the Church of England today.

When we say that *One God and Father of All* is a book of controversy, we are only saying that it is such a book as the occasion demands: and the price demanded by brevity and force and point must be paid. In two cases we are inclined to think that our authors have been ready to pay too much: in the matter of Roman Catholic theology, particularly in the fields of comparative religion, of the history of doctrine, and of technical religious philosophy, they seem to us to underestimate the work that has been done; and, as regards the tradition of St. Peter's domicile in Rome, they appear to take

* Mowbray, pp. vii+158. 2s. 6d. net.

Dr. Merrill's *Essays in Early Christian History* altogether too seriously. But these are, after all, subordinate points, and do not affect the main argument. And that main argument, which is directed against the dogma of Papal Infallibility and the whole conception of authority that goes with it, is, in our judgment, simply devastating. A Cambridge professor, after reading the book, remarked that he had "never seen so many heavenly brick-bats thrown with such accuracy of aim." The comment is as apt as it is playful. The dogma, so skilfully inveigled out of the Vatican Council in 1870 by the Roman hierarchy in England, is riddled to tatters by this book.

The Roman dogma asserts that the Pope, when he speaks *ex cathedra* on matters of faith or morals, is infallible. Our authors give illustrations of important issues, both doctrinal and ethical, on which the Roman Church has been manifestly mistaken. Pope Eugenius IV., for instance, gave a definition of the form and matter of the sacrament of Holy Orders which, if true, would mean that there were no valid orders in Christendom, not even his own; while the attitude of Rome in regard to persecution, from the days of Innocent III. to the end of the Reformation period, was totally unworthy of Christianity. Defenders of infallibility fall back upon the Pope's "ordinary authority" to account for these errors, and endeavour to distinguish it from his infallible authority. But our authors have no difficulty in showing the absurdities to which this distinction leads. "It takes away the whole value of the claim to be a divine teacher with infallible authority, which will enable the ordinary man to find a safe refuge from his perplexities. He never knows whether the Infallible Authority in which he has put his trust is speaking infallibly or not. It may just be speaking with its 'ordinary authority,' and he is bound to accept that authority. *But that 'ordinary authority' may be wrong.*"

Actually it would appear that, according to the more cautious Roman Catholic view, "there have been only two occasions in the whole history of the Church on which the Pope is generally held to have spoken infallibly." They are represented by the *Tome* of St. Leo in A.D. 451 and the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX. in 1854. But what, it may be asked, is the value to the ordinary believer of an infallible authority which has only spoken infallibly twice in nineteen centuries? And, even then, how do we know that it was infallible? An Anglican would defend the high authority of the *Tome* on the grounds of its conformity to Scripture and of its

verification by the *consensus fidelium*: but the defender of Papal Infallibility is precluded by the terms of the dogma from any such reasoning. The consent of the Church makes no odds to the Pope's *ex cathedra* utterances; they are irreformable of themselves: his infallibility is their guarantee. And yet none can tell whether the guarantee has been attached or not in any particular case. There would appear to be need, at least, of a certificate stating whether an utterance should be regarded as infallible. And even then we should need to know the authority of the certificate. The truth is that the dogma of Papal Infallibility is fundamentally irrational—a bold piece of ecclesiastical bluff. And the bluff has been called.

What, then, is the situation that remains? The situation that remains is sufficiently denoted by the Catholic faith and life of Canterbury, Constantinople, and Rome. *One God and Father of All* is not merely a criticism of Papal Infallibility; it is also a very fine vindication of Catholicism, and not least of Anglo-Catholicism. Some might suppose that so controversial a work would make the task of future Catholic reunion more difficult; but they would be mistaken. The reason is that both sides to the controversy are agreed on the principle of the Church's visible unity as of divine origin; and on the basis of that principle there is room for hard, clean blows which as between Catholic and Protestant would, no doubt, be fatal to ultimate reconciliation. On the other hand, once the exclusive claims of Rome are shown to be illusory, the way is open for other conceptions of the Catholic Church and of its authority at once more rational and more just. On both matters our authors have something illuminating to say.

The clue to the Church's unity is found in the old analogy which was worked out in the pages of this Journal by the present Master of Corpus nearly two years ago:* it is the analogy of a race. The unity of a race is not necessarily shown in a single form of government, though that may be its ideal expression: it is the possession of common blood, traditions, customs, and institutions. For the community of blood which characterized the Jewish race, the new Israel of the Church substitutes the common participation in the Holy Spirit. For the rest, this book names Five Points in which the unity of the Catholic Church finds visible expression in the three œcumenical jurisdictions of Canterbury, Constantinople, and Rome; and they are worth naming here, because they may well become historic.

* THEOLOGY, March, 1928.

They are: (1) the Unity of Faith, seen in the creeds; (2) the Unity of Worship, seen in the sacraments and liturgies; (3) the Unity of Holy Order, seen in the Apostolic ministry; (4) the Unity of Fruits, seen in the lives of the saints; and (5) the Unity of Outlook and Atmosphere, seen in the Church's devotional life, in the style and beauty of its buildings and services, and not least in that acid test of religious earnestness, the provision of schools for the young. To these a sixth point is added —namely, the invisible unity which is realized in the Church's fellowship with the Communion of Saints.* A full Christian and Catholic life needs no more than these things for its sustenance, and can be content with no less.

When we come to the conception of authority, we pass to a more difficult matter; but to those who realize the dangers that lie in false simplifications of religious truth—dangers as well illustrated by the dogma of Papal Infallibility as by the Liberal Protestant plea for "a simple, undogmatic faith"—the difficulties will not be felt as an obstacle. According to the book before us, the ultimate authorities for the Christian must always be the Person of our Lord and the conscience (surely a truer and less prejudiced word than "private judgment") of the individual guided by the Holy Spirit. To these must be added the living tradition of faith and life which characterizes Catholic Christendom—a system of truth, based upon Scripture, coherent with itself, rational in its account of God and His dealings with man, and verified by its results in human character of the most diverse types.

Our authors have been severely taken to task for their attitude on this question, not least by the *Church Times*, which desires a clear doctrine of the infallibility of the Church. But we do not believe that infallibility, *in the sense in which that word is ordinarily used*, is one of the things that God has promised to His Church or that the Church needs. What He has promised, and what we need, is "sufficient light i' the dark to rise by"; and this we have because the Church is guided by the Holy Spirit. "Indefectibility" is a name often used for this belief, and it appears to serve the purpose. For in the long run an infallible Church is as much open to objection as an infallible Bible: it discounts the human element in inspiration and revelation, and assumes that grace supersedes nature. To say that grace illuminates nature and that

* This last point was elaborated with singular eloquence in Mr. Milner-White's paper at the first Anglo-Catholic Congress in 1920.

it overrules nature is one thing: to say that it supersedes and supplants it, at least on certain occasions, is another. The first of these allows for some measure of refraction of the divine light by the human medium; as the Apostle puts it, "now we see through a glass darkly": the second allows for no refraction at all. And this second view is symptomatic of a tendency towards a Eutychian view of the relations of God and man which is deeply ingrained in Latin theology. It is seen, for instance, in the exaggerated value attached to celibacy; in exaggerated devotions to the Blessed Virgin Mary; above all in the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as understood by scholastic theology, which goes so far as to overthrow the nature of a sacrament. We must face the fact that we have not got, and cannot have, anywhere in this life the absolute truth on any subject: if we had got it, it would blind us and we should go mad. What we have got is the best statements of truth available to the Church on the issues before it; and with that we must be content.

The position may be illustrated by reference to the works of two modern Roman Catholic writers. The authors of *One God and Father of All* observe that the late Baron von Hügel was much more appreciated in the Anglican Communion than in his own. One reason for this may be found in his attitude to precisely this problem of authority and truth in religion. Thoroughly loyal to Rome as he was, von Hügel was on this issue far more Anglican than Roman. Like our authors, he lays the main stress on the Person of our Lord Himself: like them, he insists on full recognition being given to the human conditionment of our Lord's divinity in His incarnate life, and yet claims that "we do not, by any such admission, cease from holding a glorious central, spiritual, and moral inerrancy of insight and instinct in our Blessed Lord's teaching and life." And he goes on to say that the same double truth holds good of the Church and its authority. There is an inerrancy in the Church—von Hügel nowhere, I think, ascribes inerrancy to the Pope—but it is not, as has been supposed, of an intellectualist kind: rather it is "primarily one of spiritual instinct and affinity for and with the religious and moral direction given to life itself."* And the reason lies in the nature of religious truth itself. Perhaps the best example of von Hügel's teaching on this point will be found in the section entitled "The Vivid Dimness of Religious Belief" in *Readings from Friedrich von Hügel*.† Speaking of the realities with which religion deals,

* See *Essays and Addresses*, Second Series, pp. 20-23.

† Edited, with an Introductory Essay, by Algar Thorold (J. M. Dent and Sons, 1928, 7s. 6d. net): the best introduction to von Hügel's writings.

he says that "*we get to know that we really know* these realities by finding our knowledge (dim, difficult, non-transferable though it be) approving itself to us as fruitful."* This is exactly the position of *One God and Father of All*. Simple people "will accept the Catholic Faith as a whole, and not worry about any authority, except their own experience of the value of the Catholic Faith in their own lives and in the life of the Church." And this criterion is our Lord's. "He that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." Equally significant, we may add, is the agreement between our authors and von Hügel as to the way in which more educated people come to faith. "Intelligent people do not really believe on authority. They are convinced that what the Church teaches is true by learning why the Church teaches it. *And in any case you can only be persuaded to accept the authority of the Church because you are given reasonable grounds for doing so.*"† It is significant that that is precisely the method which von Hügel adopted in those charming letters in which he helped his niece,‡ Mrs. Plunket Greene, to change her ecclesiastical allegiance. Throughout the series there is little or no appeal to authority, and none to infallibility; instead, one after another of the Church's distinctive doctrines, practices, devotional habits is taken up, explained, and commended, and its truth allowed to sink in by its own weight.

The second writer whom this book calls to mind is Professor Karl Adam of Tübingen, the author of a very charming work entitled *The Spirit of Catholicism*.§ The reader will go far before he finds a more impressive exposition of Catholicism than is given here. Its compact and chiselled style seems an apt expression of the coherent faith and life to which it bears witness; and its pacific temper gives it an unusual force. Its chief weakness lies, as might be expected, in its handling of the historical foundations and the doctrinal significance of the papacy. So far as the history is concerned, one may agree that the New Testament points to a Petrine primacy. But it is a far cry from primacy to papacy; and even supposing that the fullest weight is given to all the Petrine texts, and all the critical questions settled in Rome's favour, can anyone really think that, if the papacy existed in the first century even in germ, the Gospels or the Acts of the Apostles or the Epistles would not have been very different from what, in fact, they are? And when we turn

* *Op. cit.*, p. 292 (italics ours). † *One God and Father of All*, p. 96.

‡ *Letters from Baron Friedrich von Hügel to a Niece.* Edited, with an Introduction, by Gwendolen Greene. J. M. Dent and Sons. 1928. 7s. 6d. net.

§ Sheed and Ward, 1929. 7s. 6d. net.

to doctrine, we are struck by a note of inconsistency in Dr. Adam's treatment. When he says that "in the papacy the community . . . grasps and realizes itself as the one Kingdom of God, as the one Body of Christ on the earth," he is interpreting the organic relation in which any true primacy must stand towards the Church as a whole. But he proceeds to invalidate this relation at a stroke, when he adds that "the Pope, in whom this community by Christ's will obtains visible form, rules absolutely *ex sese*, that is to say, that in his activity he is in no respect dependent on any member of the Body of Christ, neither on the whole episcopate, nor on individual bishops, nor on the rest of the faithful. He is not merely one 'pastor' alongside others; he is the pastor to whom alone the sheep of the Divine Pastor are committed (*cf.* John xxi. 15 *ff.*)." Absolutism could not go further; and it is astonishing that Dr. Adam should not have realized the complete antinomy between this doctrine and (let us say) St. Paul's doctrine of the Church in 1 Corinthians or Ephesians.

When we pass, however, from this issue to Dr. Adam's vindication of Catholicism as a whole, we are on different ground, and ground that is common to him and to ourselves. His conception of the relation of the Bible to the Church, for instance, including the noteworthy admission that "all literature, and even the Bible itself, is stamped with the character of its time," is one which is a commonplace of Anglican theology. His interpretation of our Lord's eschatological teaching as due to the fact that "regarding and valuing things in a prophetic manner, He made no distinction between today and tomorrow," and more particularly his view that:

> Precisely because Jesus knew that the Kingdom of God was already established in His own Person, because it was a central fact of His consciousness that the great separation of spirits, the judgment of the world, had already begun in His Person, He necessarily regarded all the events that depended upon His Person as particular moments of the General Judgment which was fundamentally and practically inaugurated with His Person,

show him among the moderns in his reading of the Gospels.* If he does not go so far as the authors of *One God and Father of All* in admitting that the Apostles were in error as to the imminence of our Lord's return in glory, he none the less allows it of "the disciples" other than the Twelve. His defence of Catholic "intolerance" as truth's intolerance of error† is safeguarded by

* The present writer may perhaps be allowed to draw attention to his own similar treatment of the problem in *The Teaching of Christ*, ch. v., and *The Approach to Christianity*, ch. iv.

† *Cf.* the Preface to the third edition of *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. xii.

a frank disavowal of the legitimacy of persecution as a means of propagating the faith, and frequent recognition of the Church's sins in this regard which recalls the opening passages of *One God and Father of All*. And he insists—even though the Pope's armed guards seem to belie his claim—that not domination but service, "loving ministry and ministering love," is the mark of the Kingdom of God.

We are glad to dwell upon these points of agreement between Dr. Adam and ourselves, because the common principles shared alike by Canterbury, Constantinople, and Rome are the greatest asset of Christianity in the world today. It is often said that nothing is more needed today in the Church of England than an adequate exposition of the doctrine of the Church. Among the materials for such a work the writings of the Russian theologian, Khomiakoff, and of the German Catholic, Dr. Karl Adam, will repay very careful consideration; and a critical and constructive comparison of them at Anglican hands should give us what we need. Mr. Milner-White and Mr. Knox would put us doubly in their debt if they should undertake it.

We promised to conclude with some discussion of the bearing of *One God and Father of All* upon current issues in the Church at home. The attitude of the *Church Times* towards the book makes this particularly desirable, all the more in view of that paper's generous attitude towards *Essays Catholic and Critical* and the *New Commentary*. Allusion has already been made to the complaint that this book surrenders the infallibility of the Church. It is also criticized on other grounds. One is that it is too "academic"; to which a sufficient answer may perhaps be found in its widespread appearance on shop counters and railway bookstalls. If ever the learning of the Universities was "got across" to the plain man, it is here. A more serious charge is that of Modernism. In face of the following sentences, this criticism is surely astonishing:

> Modernism within the Church today is an over-eager, muddled, unsympathetic, but honest attempt to help doubters and to be up to date in the reconciliation to which we have alluded; and suffers from not knowing thoroughly either the Faith which it reinterprets, or the science at whose heels it runs, or the needs of the souls which it is trying to help (*One God*, etc., p. 22).

It is true that our authors adopt a thoroughly critical attitude towards traditions as such, and we do not always agree

with them. But there is not the slightest indication anywhere in the book that they are other than complete and whole-hearted believers in the Catholic Faith. On the ethical question of birth control, no doubt, our authors have departed more widely from traditional positions. But we think that they were right to be outspoken; and no one will accuse two such staunch celibates of a lax view of the meaning of chastity.

If the *Church Times* has been mainly critical, it is significant that the *E.C.U. Gazette* and the *Green Quarterly* (which largely represents the Anglo-Catholic Congress) have given the book a cordial welcome. For the book, as we have indicated, has far more than a controversial importance: it indicates an attitude towards Anglicanism and its place in Christendom which needs constant reaffirmation. We may illustrate the point from a recent notice of the third edition of *Essays Catholic and Critical* contained in the *Times Literary Supplement* (December 19, 1929):

> The new preface (it is stated) raises its own questions. What is the difference between Anglican, Anglo-Catholic, and Liberal Catholic theology? If they are the same, why should not the first term suffice to describe it? If they differ, what exactly does each of them stand for? Are we not to be allowed by the substitution of the word Anglicanism for Anglo-Catholicism to say, "All agree in seeing in (Anglicanism) an attitude towards the principles and practices of Christianity which is of moment to the whole Church of Christ"?

We may reply: The answer to this last question is in the affirmative, so long as Anglicanism be understood in the sense in which Anglo-Catholics understand it. We do not think it would be true of Anglicanism as understood by the Erastian Protestants, for instance, or by the sentimental school so well represented at Liverpool; for the one has principles of purely national interest, and the principles of the other have not as yet been disclosed. That is why the term Anglo-Catholic cannot well be dispensed with. An Anglo-Catholic is an Anglican who emphasizes the universal or Catholic elements in Anglicanism, is alive to its affinities with the Catholic heritage as a whole, and, instead of reducing the Christian revelation to a supposed conformity with modern knowledge, insists on integrating the two in an ever-growing synthesis. And for that reason his theology is liberal, and he may be called a Liberal Catholic. His liberalism lies in his fearless belief in reason and his conviction that in matters of truth the function of authority is to serve as a guide to reason, and not as a refuge from it. And he claims that the chief characteristic of Anglican theology

is its combination of authority and reason, and that on this basis it is able to vindicate the Catholic faith and life as a whole to the hearts and minds of men.

It is no accident, then, that the most effective rejoinder made to Roman claims in the present century should have come from Anglicans who are Anglo-Catholics, and who write from a liberal standpoint. It is effective precisely because it confronts Rome with a wider Catholic synthesis than Rome has as yet any room for—a synthesis, moreover, which, despite many exaggerations of this or that element in certain quarters, is, in fact, operative in the Anglican Communion. The task of the Church in the present generation is to rise to the height of its own principles, and to teach them in season and out of season. It is, no doubt, partly true that the English people are fearful of applying their minds to their religion, and prefer to accept it, if at all, as a sentiment rather than a faith. Hence the attraction of undenominationalism. It is also true that the chief strength of Rome's appeal lies in the apparent effectiveness of its jurisdiction, and that in that matter the English Church often gives us cause for shame. When bishops, for instance, openly break the law, or encourage their clergy to break it, by inviting those who have never been confirmed (and perhaps not even baptized) to what are called "united Communion services," while at the same time they punish other clergy for having unauthorized services in connexion with the Blessed Sacrament, it is obvious that the spirit of unity and corporate loyalty is greatly impaired. Clergy and laity cannot fail to find obedience difficult, when those who exercise jurisdiction over them set so inconsistent an example. But these difficulties only constitute a still plainer challenge to all who love Anglicanism to bear clear witness to the faith that is in them. And in the long run, that faith, because it is built on the truth, will prevail.

CONFIRMATION AND SOUTH INDIA—II

III

We turn now to an aspect of the problem of the relation of Confirmation to Baptism which seems hitherto to have been completely overlooked. The Gospels represent the Spirit as descending upon our Lord at His baptism, but what can this actually mean? Dare anyone say that this was the *beginning* of the Spirit's indwelling in Him? And if not, and if the Spirit is wholly present wherever He is present at all, how could the Spirit "come" where He was already? Only if we can answer this question shall we have got to the root of the difficulty.

Dr. Darwell Stone (*op. cit.*, pp. 70-73) points to our Lord's experience of the Spirit at His baptism as an analogy with our experience of the Spirit at our Confirmation. In neither case dare we say that we have a *beginning* of the Spirit's indwelling. "In Baptism," he says, "wherein the Christian life begins to be, the Christian receives the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost as Christ received it at His conception when His human life began to be. In Confirmation the Christian receives a fresh gift of the same divine indwelling to strengthen him for the battle of life, as Christ received a like fresh gift at the time of His baptism before His ministry began" (p. 72). But Dr. Stone apparently does not see that if Baptism in our Lord's case could not be the inception of the Spirit's indwelling, *neither can it in ours*. We believe, do we not, that the Holy Spirit is Christ's Vicar on earth, making His presence effective? If so, then it is through the Spirit that Christ "upholds all things by the word of His power," and the Spirit must indwell us and all things from the beginning of our existence. How, then, can we talk about "a fresh gift of the divine indwelling"? Where the Spirit is, there He is entirely, and so there seems to be no room even for the doctrine that in Baptism, much less in Confirmation, there is a *bestowal* of the Spirit. We must admit this, or else adopt one of two alternatives. Either Christ was not indwelt by the Spirit before His baptism, or else the Spirit's indwelling admits of degree, in which case Christ was not indwelt by the Spirit before His baptism in as high a degree as He was afterwards. The latter alternative seems just as unacceptable as the former. Yet a view which seems to force us to admit that there is no bestowal of the Spirit either in Baptism or in Confirmation—because He is in us from the beginning of our existence—is so startling that we are not likely to welcome it offhand. We shall now endeavour to show

how this doctrine may be less revolutionary than it at first seems.

Because the Holy Spirit is Person and we are persons, His relations with us can only be *personal*, whether we are conscious of them or not. We do wrong to think of the gift of the Spirit even quasi-materially. Let us think, then, of a simple analogy. The relation between a father and his child is personal. It begins at the beginning of the child's existence. From one point of view the father can never be *more* a father than he is at any time; yet from another point of view his fatherhood does in a way admit of degree. In the ideal relationship of father and child the expression of fatherhood is called out in various degrees, not by the whim or choice of the father, but solely by the needs of the child. What constitutes true fatherhood at one stage would be inadequate at another, yet at each stage we can only call the relationship true fatherhood. So also in our personal relationship with the Holy Spirit. From the beginning of our existence that relationship is correctly described as an indwelling, and it never becomes anything else. But as our needs vary, so does the effect of the Spirit's indwelling vary in response. There is not, strictly speaking, a new "gift" of the Spirit, as though the Spirit were a quasi-material something outside us of which we can have more or less, any more than there is a new gift of fatherhood when a father meets some new need of his child. There is not even an intensification of the Spirit's indwelling, since where He is present at all He is all present. There is, however, a new *expression* of the Spirit's presence in and through new human needs. It is not that we get a new supply of the Spirit, to be drawn on, like an enlarged bank balance, when we feel inclined. It is that whenever we embark upon a legitimate activity we do so in the power of the Spirit, whether we are conscious of it or not. At Baptism our admission to the Church lays new duties upon us which the Spirit enables us to perform. Confirmation, as the door of admission to Holy Communion, marks the moment when we are called upon for further spiritual activity, and we embark upon this new spiritual enterprise in the power of the Spirit who already indwells us. Neither Baptism nor Confirmation gives us *more* of the Spirit than we had before; each Sacrament simply lays upon us new obligations which the Spirit enables us to undertake. To speak of this as an "increase of grace" is really a concession to the limitations of human language. It is, as our Confirmation Service accurately phrases it, an increase *in* the Spirit, not an increase *of* the Spirit.

We now see that there is no real difference between the grace of Baptism and the grace of Confirmation. Both Sacra-

ments are means of grace, not in the sense that they bring grace to us from outside, but in the sense that they call into activity grace already resident within us. So, then, when in the Western Church Confirmation is postponed, the Church does not thereby deprive us of grace for a few years. By abstaining from laying the obligation of Communion upon us she postpones the time when the indwelling Spirit will need to respond to our efforts to do all that the privilege of Communion lays upon us. But if, as in the Eastern Church, the Church by Confirmation admits us to Communion in infancy, then in infancy the indwelling Spirit enables us to meet the demands which the privilege of Communion *then* makes upon us. One hesitates to use a mechanical analogy with so high a theme, and yet a simple one may make our view easier to follow. Let us compare (with due reverence) the indwelling of the Spirit in us with the engine in a motor-car. On the level, when the going is easy, the engine runs at much below its capacity. Downhill, when the going begins to be too fast to be good for us, the engine may act as a brake. Uphill, when the going begins to be strenuous and difficult, the engine exerts its full powers. We do not add a few horse-power to the engine before we start to climb the hill. The power is always there, but it only shows itself when it is needed. Similarly we begin life fully equipped with the indwelling Spirit, and when we come to the hills we call Baptism and Confirmation the Spirit carries us to the top of them and helps us to live in these higher realms. Only, of course, we can "grieve the Holy Spirit of God."

It is not a valid objection to this view that it involves an operation of the Spirit upon us which is not on our part consciously personal. Thus Dr. Relton (*Confirmation*, vol. i., p. 315), writing of Infant Baptism as a "miracle of Divine Grace," says that "we must admit, I think, the presence of impersonal operations of God's grace even in the sphere where they are seemingly most out of place and illegitimate—viz., in the relationship of a moral and spiritual God with moral and spiritual sons." He does not seem to see, however, that we cannot think of Baptism as a *beginning* of these "impersonal operations of God's grace." (We should prefer not to call them "impersonal," but to describe them as not consciously personal on our side, though of course they are really personal, as being the relation of the Divine Person with us as persons.) We may add, too, that our view seems to throw light on the part played by faith in securing the efficacy of the Sacraments as means of grace. The Church lays obligations upon us, but until we can *see* that she does so, and welcome them (that is, until we in some measure come to hold "the faith"), we natur-

ally take no fresh action that calls for a new manifestation of the Spirit's activity in us. Thus a baptized infant differs at the moment from an unbaptized one only in the fact that its admission to the Church has laid obligations and conferred privileges upon it (we call them "regeneration," "remission of sins," etc.), but as it grows older and comes to realize what was done at its Baptism, and tries to live accordingly, the child finds that it is enabled by the Spirit to do what faith impels it to attempt. In other words, there is a delay of the Spirit's operation until faith on the part of the recipient of the Sacrament calls for His operation. Baptism and Confirmation are hills only when we attempt to climb them! Apparently this is what Dr. Oman means when he says that "prayer, word, and Sacrament are still the means of grace, yet only as they are moral means adapted to moral ends, and not merely as they are devices or vehicles or impressive doings. Except as moral means they cannot help to manifest God's gracious personal relation to His children; for devices for wringing blessings out of God or vehicles for conveying something into man, however individual they may be, are not, in any moral sense, personal" (*Grace and Personality*, quoted by Relton, *op. cit.*, p. 316). It also answers Calfhill's offensive question, "What promise have they of grace annexed unto their Sacrament, unless they have shut up the Holy Ghost in their grease-pot?"

If this view is right, many far-reaching consequences follow. For example, we shall have to think of the Church not as an exclusively "Spirit-bearing body," but as a "Spirit-using body." The question of the relation of the grace of Matrimony, or of Orders, to that of other Sacraments will be easier to think out. Spiritual healing will be seen to be really spiritual, and not make-believe or magic. But here we are chiefly concerned with its effect upon the South Indian proposals. On this view, the difference between Confirmation and other forms of admission to Holy Communion is one simply of *order*. We would not deny that any act which we regard as laying greater obligations upon us as Christians will be met by the Spirit's activity in us. The question is, *How* ought such obligations to be laid upon us? Is there a right way from which we should not depart? Now we can fairly claim that Confirmation is at least as edifying as any of the admission ceremonies devised by Nonconformists, and, as practised in the East, it is quite as convenient, while even the Western use cannot seriously be objected to as inconvenient as long as it is remembered that not actual Confirmation, but a readiness and desire to be confirmed, is the door of admission to Communion. Further, Confirmation is a rite hallowed by unbroken use in the Church from the earliest

days. Even so, if we were to grant that Confirmation stands or falls simply on its intrinsic merits, we could hardly insist that it alone should be practised. There is something else. Though we cannot point to any New Testament passage which explicitly traces it back to Christ, there is always the possibility (we should say, the probability) that it *was* among "the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God" about which He spoke to His Apostles shortly before His Ascension. The place it occupies in the New Testament, and has since always occupied in the Church, strongly suggests that this is so. Now our position as regards our Lord is that whatever He willed us to do we are bound to do, and if there is a *possibility* that He willed so and so, and there is no obvious advantage in doing otherwise, then that possibility ought to rule us just as much as certainty would. We must avoid even the risk of departing from what He laid down.

In a matter like Confirmation, the only way we can seek to ascertain Christ's will is by studying the New Testament and the life of the primitive Church. What do we find there? In the New Testament, as soon as we read of Baptism being administered in the absence of Apostles, we find two of them going and laying their hands upon those baptized. The only time we get anything like a description of a Baptism performed by St. Paul we find him completing the Baptism by the laying on of hands. In the primitive Church we find Bishops doing the same. There is no proof that persons were admitted to Communion *without* such laying on of hands, but strong reason to believe that this was always required of them. We say, then, that a risk of departing from what Christ laid down in this matter would be taken if we dethroned Confirmation from its place. The rite itself must be retained without competitors.

But what of the ministers of this Sacrament? In the New Testament we find Baptism administered by those who were not Apostles, but Confirmation we find administered only by Apostles. Possibly this is only an accident, and others besides Apostles confirmed; but we can only be guided by the life of the primitive Church. If others besides Apostles confirmed in New Testament times, we should expect to find them doing the same in later times, but we never do find this. To be on the safe side, then, we must follow the practice of the primitive Church. The rite of Confirmation could go on for ever, but the Apostles could not. If it was important during their lifetime it would be important afterwards, and it is reasonable to assume that they made arrangements about it. We can even see a good reason why they should do so. Confirmation by Apostles, or by those appointed to confirm by Apostles, meant that no one became

a fully-privileged member of the Church until he had been approved by those who had better right than anyone else to decide who should be admitted to the Church's privileges. Accordingly, we find that the Bishops who ruled the Church always kept the power of confirming very much in their own hands, just as they did (for the same reason) the power of ordaining. In the Eastern Church, indeed, they have partly delegated this power of confirming to priests, yet, as the priest must be in possession of chrism consecrated by the Bishop, he is obviously only acting as the Bishop's suffragan. In the Western Church, too, the power of confirming is occasionally delegated to priests, but it does not thereby escape from the Bishop's close control. Never has the power been delegated to laymen, and never have laymen or priests been allowed to assume this power themselves. In passing we would remark that the Western retention of the power of confirming in the Bishop's own hands has much to commend it. It invests the rite with appropriate dignity, and it does to some extent compel the Bishop to go round his diocese!

We say, then, that the New Testament and the primitive Church bring us as near to the mind of Christ in this matter as we can possibly get, and if we keep close to them we are far less likely to depart from His will than if we invent some other way, particularly when, as with Confirmation, the thing itself is intrinsically at least as good as its would-be competitors. For this reason we cannot take the risk of spoiling the unique place which Confirmation holds, and has always held, in the Catholic Church.

A. E. MORRIS.

A NOTE ON CONFIRMATION*

THOSE who have read the present writer's essay on "The Origins of the Sacraments" in *Essays Catholic and Critical* will have noticed that great stress was there laid upon "Dominical institution" as the historically verifiable guarantee of the objective efficaciousness and "general necessity for salvation" of the two great original sacraments, Initiation and the Eucharist. But in the case of the former, though it was contended that in our Lord's intention the actual Baptism or ceremonial washing was meant to be preceded by Repentance, as John's baptism had been, and also to be followed (as John's baptism had *not* been followed, save in Christ's own case) by the reception

* Written originally as a note to Professor Williams's essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*.

of "Holy Spirit," we did not feel able to claim the direct authority of the Saviour for the outward sign with which the final stage of Initiation is in the New Testament explicitly associated—namely, the Laying on of Hands. This we attributed to "Apostolic" rather than "Dominical" institution. The question naturally arises, for those who are endeavouring to think the Church's sacramental theology over afresh in the light of modern knowledge, "How far can it be claimed that 'Confirmation' is a ceremony indispensable in a fully-developed Church life, and how far can it be asserted that its reception is vital to the normal spiritual growth of the individual Christian?" The question is peculiarly insistent in connection with the movement towards Reunion, which will before long compel the Anglican Communion to decide once and for all whether it intends to insist upon the acceptance of Confirmation by those who at present do not possess it as a *sine qua non* of their admission to full fellowship with itself. What reply can be returned to the Free Churches when they ask in their corporate capacity, as individual Free Churchmen who have thoughts of being reconciled to the English Church often ask the parish priest: "If we already possess—as you frequently admit that we do possess—the *virtus sacramenti*, the inward and spiritual grace of Confirmation, the reality of Spirit-possession, what need is there for us to submit in mature life, after years of conscious experience of 'love, joy, and peace' in the Holy Spirit, to the imposition of a Bishop's hands, which you yourselves do not contend to have been enjoined by Christ?"

This question, serious enough in itself, is crossed and complicated by a second—namely, What, after all, *is* "Confirmation"? The name has been applied in the post-Reformation Church of England to the imposition of the Bishop's hands upon children who have come to years of discretion: but before the Reformation it denoted in England, as it still denotes throughout the Latin Church, a rite of which the central point is the unction of the candidate's forehead by the Bishop. This Latin form of Confirmation contains nothing that the plain man would naturally describe as the laying of a hand upon the candidate's head, though Latin theologians affirm the identity of this rite with that recorded in Acts viii. to have been administered by SS. Peter and John, and (as it seems, somewhat by a *tour de force*) construe the contact of the Bishop's thumb with the candidate's forehead in the act of anointing as an "imposition of hands."* It is, however (though now, like the

* It does not appear to be claimed that the stretching out of the Bishop's hands towards the whole body of candidates at the beginning of the service represents the Apostolic imposition of hands.

Anglican form, separated from Baptism by an interval of years), manifestly the same rite as the Eastern "Chrism" or "Myrrh," sometimes, indeed, known as "Confirmation" (βεβαίωσις), which is administered in infancy immediately after Baptism, thus continuing, though under the altered conditions of pædobaptism, the original form of Initiation, in which washing and the conferring of Holy Spirit were successive parts of one sacramental rite. Here, again, there is no imposition of hands, unless the manual contact involved in anointing can be described as such. The patristic and liturgiological evidence seems to show that during the second and third centuries of our era Confirmation everywhere included both unction and the imposition of hands, but that from the middle of the fourth century the latter tended to die out or to become merged in the act of anointing.* These facts seem to present us with a somewhat disconcerting discrepancy between Scripture and Catholic tradition, or at least much Catholic practice, as to the outward sign in Confirmation: and an additional complication is introduced by certain New Testament texts (2 Cor. i. 21, 1 John ii. 20, 27), which speak of the "anointing" possessed by Christians in a way which strongly suggests, to say the least, that they are referring to a part of the initiatory rite—in other words, that Confirmation by unction was practised in the Apostolic Church—a suggestion which has appeared probable to two such impartial scholars as the late Bishop Chase,† and Dr. Lowther Clarke.‡ It is, however, equally possible that the texts in question may be merely metaphorical, and that the practice of unction was based upon them, and not *vice versa*.

With regard to the inward and spiritual grace of Confirmation and its relation to that bestowed in Baptism, there is amongst modern Anglican divines even less agreement, opinions ranging between the view advocated by the late Dr. A. J. Mason§ and Fr. Puller,‖ which assigns the whole function of Spirit impartation to Confirmation, leaving Baptism only a negative and sin-absolving efficacy, and the view set forth in the Bishop of Gloucester's Bampton Lectures,¶ which reduces Confirmation, at any rate as administered in the Church of England, to a ceremonial method of admitting adolescents to communicant *status*.

The difficulties arising from these uncertainties appear at first sight formidable. Yet each of these questions is susceptible

* This evidence is admirably summarized by the Bishop of Moray in *Confirmation* (S.P.C.K., 1926), vol. i., c. 2.

† *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age*, 1909, pp. 53-60.

‡ *Confirmation*, vol. i., p. 12, n. 4.

§ *The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*. 1893.

‖ *What is the Distinctive Grace of Confirmation?* 1880.

¶ Page 295.

of a solution which is sufficient to justify traditional practice in all its main forms. It will be convenient to state the solutions in an order the reverse of that in which we have formulated the problems, dealing with the essence and significance of Confirmation first, and the ultimate authority on which it is based last.

(*a*) *The "Form" and "Matter" of Confirmation.*—It would be generally agreed that the "form" is simply prayer for the gift of the Holy Spirit, and need not be further defined. In view of the divergence of testimony in regard to the "matter," it seems impossible to assert dogmatically that it consists either in imposition of hands or in chrismation: we can only say that it must consist in some external symbolic act other than and additional to the lustration which constitutes Baptism. Though it is difficult to imagine any practical reason why any branch of the Church should be unwilling to conform to either of the two traditional usages, it is theoretically not inconceivable that Confirmation might be administered by insufflation, or by unction with some fluid other than oil or balsam.

(*b*) *The Minister.*—The facts both of Scripture and of Church history seem to be adequately covered by the statement that the minister of Confirmation is one vested with Apostolic authority, acting either directly or through a delegate commissioned for the purpose.*

(*c*) *The Grace of Confirmation.*—One extreme position (the affirmation that whilst Baptism makes men members of Christ it does not convey to them the Holy Spirit, this being exclusively the effect of Confirmation) seems to involve an impossibly Tritheistic separation between the Persons of the Holy Trinity. The other extreme position, that Confirmation is now no more than a formal means of admitting the young to full Church membership, drives a fatal wedge between the modern Church and the Church of the Apostles and the Fathers. We therefore conclude that Baptism and Confirmation both confer the gift of the Holy Spirit, the former imparting His presence in that measure which is necessary for new birth and salvation, the latter bestowing a further influx in His life-giving power adequate, if rightly used and responded to, for the achievement of Christian perfection and stability.†

These statements, I believe, represent the essence of the Catholic doctrine of Confirmation, and are, I hope, sufficient to clear away preliminary difficulties as to what Confirmation

* The priest who, as occasionally in the Roman Communion and usually in the Eastern, confirms with chrism blessed by a Bishop is such a delegate.

† *Cf.* Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, lib. iv., dist. vii. (de confirmatione): "uirtus autem huius sacramenti est donatio spiritus sancti ad robur, qui in baptismo datus est ad remissionem."

actually is. The matter can, indeed, be simplified still further by defining the doctrine of Confirmation as the belief that, whilst Baptism can be conferred by any member of the Church, ordained or lay, the final stage of Initiation which imparts the second and final instalment of the Holy Spirit requires the intervention, *per se vel per alium*, of an Apostle or of a "successor of the Apostles." Obviously this involves the assumption that the Bishops or chief rulers of the Church form one body with the Apostles, an assumption which cannot be discussed within the limits of a note, and which therefore must here be taken for granted. If, however, this may be done, we shall be in a position to face the ultimate question, "What authority had the Apostles, or the Church, to distinguish between two outpourings or instalments of Holy Spirit, and to annex the second to an outward sign requiring the intervention of an Apostle or Apostolic officer?"

Assuming the historicity of Acts viii. 14-17, which seems only open to attack on *a priori* and subjective grounds, the answer to the first part of this question is that the distinction was not invented by the Apostles, but forced upon them by the facts of experience at Samaria and, we may reasonably infer from the account of St. Paul's proceedings at Ephesus (Acts xix. 2-6), elsewhere. In the first of these passages, indeed, the distinction is expressed with almost startling abruptness, and in a manner which would not have been natural in orthodox Christians of a later epoch, when the doctrine of the Trinity and its corollary, the doctrine of the *Perichoresis* or mutual coinherence of the Divine Persons, had been more fully developed—a fact which shows the primitive character of the tradition: "for as yet (Spirit) was fallen upon none of them: only they had been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus." The "only" might almost be taken as a disparagement of Baptism by itself. After the first enthusiastic period which followed Pentecost, it was found that whilst Baptism imparted the sense of pardon for past sins, it did not, when administered by persons other than Apostles, appear to mediate the indwelling of that mysterious thrilling energy which Christians had learnt from the Old Testament and from the Lord Himself to call "Holy Spirit," which expressed itself outwardly through supernormal *charismata*, speaking with tongues and prophecy, and inwardly through the consciousness of emotional sublimation and moral transformation. If the experience of the earliest generation of Christians may be taken as normative—and there would seem to be no meaning in the appeal to the New Testament if it may not—the responsibility for differentiating between the grace of Baptism and the grace of final Initiation would seem to lie (with reverence be it spoken) with the Holy Spirit Himself.

Granted, however, that the distinction between the two graces, or the two instalments of Holy Spirit, corresponds to reality, the question still remains, What right had the Church to affirm that the second grace is normally given in connection with an outward sign, and to restrict the conferring of such outward sign to a particular order of chief ministers? The answer is that it had every right, if it be assumed (*a*) that Initiation and its concomitant graces were entrusted by the Lord to the Church, and (*b*) that the Church in its corporate capacity is a "steward of the mysteries of God," and therefore invested with a certain economic discretion as to the way in which and the conditions under which it will dispense the treasures committed to its charge. That it has continuously claimed this discretionary power over the Sacraments, within the limits imposed by the words of the Divine Founder, is shown by its gradual adoption of Infant Baptism; by the consequential division of the originally unitary Sacrament of Initiation into Penance, Baptism, and Confirmation, and the shaping of Penance into a separate rite for the healing of post-baptismal offenders;* by the development of Penance from a public and cumbrous process, only available once in a lifetime and for dealing with the gravest sins, into a swiftly-working and secret tribunal, accessible at will even to those who are free from consciousness of deadly guilt, but out of devotion desire to cleanse themselves from the daily accumulation of venial faults; by the dissociation of the Eucharist from the common meal of which, if a literal imitation of the Lord's action had been binding upon the Church, it ought for ever to have formed a part; by the sanction given in primitive times to the administration, in exceptional circumstances, of Communion under one kind;† by the assumption of liberty to reserve the Eucharist, and so in certain instances and under stress of necessity to separate, spatially and temporally, though not spiritually, the giving of Communion from the public service of consecration and offering; by the creation of the Sacrament of the Unction of the Sick. Those who reject Confirmation will doubtless hold, if they are logical, that in sanctioning all these developments the Church exceeded its powers. Yet they may reasonably be asked to consider whether the Parable of the Talents was not meant to apply as well to the Church in its corporate capacity as to its individual members, and whether the denial of the discretionary power which the Church has claimed would not involve either the

* *Cf. Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 376 *f.*

† It will not be supposed that this reference to primitive custom is meant to defend the present Latin rule which makes communion in one kind obligatory under ordinary circumstances—a rule which, from the standpoint of the present writer, has not the authority of the whole Church.

hardening of the sacramental system into a piece of cast-iron legalism as intolerable as its Rabbinical predecessor, or, alternatively, the relegation of the Sacraments to a purely "optional" position.

To sum up. Confirmation may be said to have been "Dominically instituted" in respect of the inward grace, and "Apostolically" or "ecclesiastically instituted"* in respect of the outward sign and of the connection between inward and outward. The case for its universal and great *desirability* ("necessity" we have already confined to the two Sacraments in which both grace and sign are recorded to have been appointed by the Lord Himself) thus rests upon the conception of the Church as the divinely commissioned dispensatrix of the treasures of Holy Spirit, the authoritative custodian of the grace of Initiation. It is, I hope, hardly necessary to observe that this conception, like the whole of the foregoing exposition, must be understood in the light of the principle, *Deus non alligatur mediis, sed homo*: though this principle in no way disables the Church from asking unconfirmed candidates for her membership, who feel confident that they have already received the inward grace of Confirmation, to follow the example of Cornelius' kinsmen and near friends, who were baptized *after* the illapse of the Spirit upon them (Acts x. 47), and—in the spirit of humility and for the sake of Church order—to receive the outward sign as well. But schemes for Reunion which involve the abandonment or non-requirement of the royal seal of the Holy Ghost can never be accepted by Catholic Christians, precisely because they destroy the fundamental notion of the Church as guardian of the Saviour's grace and steward of the mysteries of God.

N. P. WILLIAMS.

* Perhaps "ecclesiastically instituted" is the more accurate phrase, as, owing to their belief in the nearness of the End, it is probable that the Apostles did not consciously conceive themselves as "instituting" a permanent rite. (We need feel no scruple about admitting with regard to the Apostles a consideration of which we have already, on p. 404 *f.* of *Essays Catholic and Critical*, disputed the validity with regard to Christ Himself: for there is no comparison between the cases.) The universal adoption and perpetuation by the Church of the Apostles' action constitutes the "institution" of Confirmation. Nevertheless, the claims of this Sacrament to veneration and reception by Christians derive immense weight from the fact that its origins are to be found in what was done by the inspired companions of the Lord and first rulers of the Church.

THE NEGLECTED MANDATE

THE Last Will and Testament of Jesus Christ—for so we must call it—is recorded in the closing words of St. Matthew's Gospel. At this date there is happily no need to defend the genuineness of those words.* In view of the place Christ holds in the making of mankind, it is impossible to exaggerate their importance. They are embedded, so to speak, in the fabric of Christianity—so far as Christianity has been realized. No one who has the moral welfare of mankind at heart, whatever his creed, can afford to neglect words so significant, least of all can the Christian Church.

They were spoken to men whom Christ had trained for the express purpose of carrying them into effect. It is immaterial to our present purpose whether we regard those men as first in an "apostolical succession," or simply as those who derived their commission direct from Christ. What is beyond question, and what alone concerns us here, is that these men—and, by implication, those who took their place—were commanded to do both of two distinct things:† they were to "make disciples" and they were to "baptize and instruct." Nor are we going to be side-tracked into a discussion whether these mandates were to be obeyed in the order in which they are recorded—whether converts were first to be trained in discipleship and then baptized (as the order would seem to imply), or whether they might first be baptized and afterwards trained in discipleship. To dally with such vexed issues would only lead to controversy. The question before us is this: Has the Christian Society inheriting this trust from the Apostles discharged its responsibilities in regard to both these mandates?

That it has been loyal to the second—to baptize and instruct—there can be no question. Admission into the fellowship of Christ's religion has always been by baptism, and, allowing for the various interpretations which "observances" have received, there has been on the whole no lack of instruction. But what about the "making of disciples"?

The very fact that there is no equivalent in the Christian vocabulary for μαθητέυσατε, that the revisers had to fall back on the awkward and not of itself intelligible "make disciples,"

* See the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. vi., p. 481 *ff.*; and Dr. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, Part II.: (i.) Even when the genuineness of the baptismal formula was questioned, there was never any doubt as to the μαθητέυσατε part of the passage, which is what we are mainly concerned with here.

† I have bracketed together "baptize" and "instruct," as the sense of the passage seems to warrant. As instruction in observances is naturally an outcome of initiation and is clearly distinct from "discipleship," it will be convenient to retain this twofold division of the Last Words.

is a proof of the neglect which this part of Christ's parting commission has suffered. Let it be clearly understood that μαθητέυσατε cannot adequately be rendered "teach," as in the A.V. The distinction between a "disciple" and one who is merely "taught" is one which will become clearer as we proceed. Meanwhile, at the outset, let us give heed to the difference which the revisers saw necessary to make between μαθητέυσατε and διδάσκοντες. If the latter means "teaching," "instructing," as it undoubtedly does, then a different thought must have been in Christ's mind when He used the former, since it is inconceivable that within one brief sentence of such tremendous import He should have repeated Himself.

What is a disciple? The history of ὁ μαθητής previous to its use by Jesus Christ does not afford us much light. In Attic Greek the "disciple" is scarcely more than the person "taught," although as applied to the pupils of the philosophers, of whom more was required than the bare reception of knowledge, it probably indicates some capacity to assimilate moral and spiritual values. The Latin equivalent of μαθητής, *discipulus*, is a word Cicero uses in the above sense. Beyond the fact that our own word "disciple" is, through its Latin derivation, a faithful transcript of μαθητής, we do not learn much from the original uses of the term.

It is when we come to follow the word through the Gospels that we find a definite advance on the idea of mere instruction. He whose words were "spirit and life" breathed into the term the vitality of a close personal relationship with Himself, and while He invested it with higher values He also brought its significance within the reach of the lowliest. It is impossible within the space of a short article to examine in detail even the most important passages in which the word "disciple" occurs. The full content of the word will assuredly dawn upon us as we reflect on what the Gospels disclose of the method Jesus Christ employed with those who attached themselves to Him, especially if we supplement this with a careful reading of the first epistle of St. John as an example of Christ-consciousness in a disciple. From such an exercise it will be clear that while the disciples received a certain amount of precept teaching, as, *e.g.*, the Sermon on the Mount, the greater part of their training was of a mimetic character, consisting in their "companying with" the Master (Acts i. 21), observing His outlook, assimilating His mind, copying His methods with the sick, the ignorant, the out-of-the-way, allowing His character to create itself in them. He was not content to furnish them with moral precepts, even the most profound and far-reaching; to equip them with a rule of life, even the most ideal. What

He looked for as the result of His intercourse with them was a reproduction of His spirit. Perhaps the best summary of the N.T. idea of discipleship is given us by Robert Louis Stevenson in chapter i. of *Lay Morals*:

> What He (Christ) taught was not a code of rules but a ruling spirit; not truths but a spirit of truth; not views but a view. What He showed was an attitude of mind. . . . To be a true disciple is to think of the same things as our prophet and to think of different things in the same order. To be of the same mind with another is to see all things in the same perspective; it is not to agree in a few indifferent matters near at hand and not much debated; it is to follow him in his furthest flights, to see the force of his hyperboles, to stand so exactly in the centre of his vision that whatever he may express your eyes will light at once on the original, that whatever he may see to declare, your mind will at once accept.*

How far this goes beyond mere instruction, how far it is from being satisfied by a "teaching of observances"—right and necessary as the latter is in its place—will be obvious on a moment's reflection. There is no desire in this to disparage the teaching profession, either religious or secular. To speak of "mere instruction" is not to forget how exacting, often thankless, always indispensable, is the profession of teaching. Moreover, there are probably few teachers nowadays, whether in public or elementary schools, who do not lay their whole personality under contribution in the pursuit of their task. The example of Thomas Arnold and Benjamin Jowett has been fruitful in every department of teaching, in an education more worthy the meaning of the word, more akin to the ideal of discipleship. Yet the fact remains that instruction can be imparted without the personality of the teacher being brought to bear on the pupil, and that knowledge, even in religious matters, can be acquired independently of the spiritual or moral character of the teacher. Witness the Confirmation classes in our public schools, and often enough those in our parishes. A very large amount of what is called "Church teaching" bears no relation whatever to our getting the standpoint of Jesus Christ. Here, again, no quarrel is suggested with teaching of this kind. It is assumed here that the Creed must be taught, Scripture expounded, and Christian ethics promulgated. All that is here insisted upon is that teaching at its highest, both in matter and method, is not on the same plane with "making disciples," and that the mandate of Jesus Christ in regard to the latter cannot possibly be fulfilled by the most conscientious attention to "teaching."

* The four short chapters of *Lay Morals* deserve far more attention from Christian readers than they have received. Notwithstanding their tendency to censoriousness, they are a wholesome reminder of the principles of Jesus Christ.

We may define the disciple, then, as one who stands to another in a relationship of spiritual derivation. This vitality, imparted to the word by Christ, has been retained ever since, enriching our conception of indebtedness in all spheres of human enterprise. To our shame, be it confessed, the term is better understood today and more familiarly used in art, craft, letters, philosophy, and politics than it is in religion! We speak quite simply and intelligibly of a disciple of Cellini or Perugino, of Marx or Einstein or Henry James, and are constantly expressing by means of "disciple" the intellectual and spiritual indebtedness of musicians, painters, and thinkers. The significance that has dropped out of Christian institutions is thus conserved by the world, and no more profitable pursuit could be followed by any group of Christian students than to consider the secular use of the term "disciple" in order to polarize the light on its sacred content.

Such consideration would yield several points of practical interest in the following of Jesus Christ today. For example, the apprentice as type of discipleship would show how vain is any verbal instruction to give him dexterity in the use of brush or chisel. He must catch from the master's hand "the trick of the tool's true play." Nor is it copying the master's work with sedulous precision that will enable him to excel. It is by using pigments and brushes in the master's way, by observing his values in light and shade, by interpreting as he interprets the proportions and relations of objects relatively to the vision within, that he may one day "become as his master."

There can be nothing servile, nothing merely reproductive in the disciple's task. The disciples of the Divine Master absorbed Him; He did not absorb them. Their identity was never lost. The difference we perceive in them in the glimpses afforded outside the Gospels is a difference, not of essential character, but of standpoint. This is one of the most striking notes of unity in the New Testament.

And in secular discipleship a like freedom joined with affinity is observable. No two men, for example, could be more constitutionally unlike, no two men could differ more widely in the character of their literary output than Carlyle and Goethe. Yet at the back of all Carlyle's work we perceive the mind of Goethe, his outlook in life and the world, and we are right in speaking of him as a disciple of Goethe, for there is no other term to express the relationship between the two men than that which Christ inspired with the idea of spiritual derivation. Once more, to be a disciple of Goethe did not consist in writing dramas as he did, or in laying out grand-ducal parks; it did consist in so penetrating the "clothes" of man and of

the universe as to perceive the spiritual creation imprisoned within. And to be a disciple of Jesus Christ is not necessarily to have nowhere to lay one's head, or to be at odds with authority, or to suffer on a cross of wood in the sight of the multitude; it does consist in an enthusiasm for the Father and in a passion for service such as places others' welfare before our own. And it is the making of these qualities in men and women that is the "making of disciples," wherein stands the redemption of mankind.

For discipleship is not an end in itself, any more than is apprenticeship or intercourse with some sage or politician. Nothing brings out this more clearly than discipleship in art, because art is primarily "extravert," an urge towards creative activity. The artist is the true ποιητής, the man who "makes," who stands so nearly related to the Creator that it is legitimate to speak of his makings as "creations." In no less active a relationship does the Christian disciple stand to Him Who is "making all things new." His very discipleship commits him to a continual transformation of the life about him.

Do Christians at all realize their religion as *art*, as a creative activity to which they are bound as disciples of their Master, in which they can find unfailing joy, inspiration, endurance, love? We talk glibly enough of our "religious art," meaning thereby our Angelicos and Peruginos and all the manifold embroidery of worship. These also have their place, since thought must find its symbol. But the true "religious art," the only kind we need deeply consider, since all other kinds flow out of it, and without it all else is meaningless, is the transforming of human life after the inspiration of Jesus Christ.

Such are some among many of the reflections which will occur to anyone who will take the world's use of "discipleship" and let it explain and justify the prominence Christ gave it in His parting words. They will learn, the more they ponder the word and its applications, how utterly inadequate is any "christening" of men and women that does not secure that a relationship between them and the Master of our lives such as discipleship involves is set up and maintained! "Go ye, make disciples of all nations."

And yet, what kind of recognition has this mandate among Christian bodies today? What kind has it ever had? The Christian Church has dwelt much on the necessity for submission, but has it ever made submission *to the Mind of Christ*, institutionally, a *sine qua non* of membership? If so, where and when? There has been submission to the Church, in the shape of the Papacy, by which men have been bonded together in corporate unity and by means of which a certain uniformity

in belief, worship, and discipline—by no means the same thing as discipleship to Christ—has been secured. But has submission to the Papacy guaranteed a perception of the standpoint of Christ or a loyal adherence to it? There has been submission to the Bible—or to a certain theory of the Bible—the *pis aller* of those who have cast off allegiance to the Papacy. The result has been some two hundred mutually exclusive Bible Christian bodies, not one of which appeals to the Mind of Christ as the test of membership. Men and women have been tested as to whether they have the mind of Calvin, the mind of Knox, the mind of Dr. Pusey. They have been tested by the Thirty-nine Articles, by the Westminster and other Confessions, by the Fifty-three Standard Sermons of John Wesley, by the eclectic vouchsafements of Mrs. Baker Eddy! It would seem as though, viewed in the light of such sayings as "Learn of Me," "Let this Mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus," institutional Christianity had gone astray from its youth up!

Imagine a stranger to the Christian faith going to a church of any denomination and applying to be trained as a disciple—what sort of reception would his request meet with? Would it be recognized as the natural preliminary to the Christian profession? Would he be introduced at once to a group of similar enquirers or disciples? Or, if our imagination should seem to run riot, let us keep to facts. We have established in our land a form of Christianity; what is the test applied to those proposed as members?

> Ye are to take care that this child be brought to the Bishop to be confirmed by him, so soon as he can say the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, and be further instructed in the Church Catechism set forth for that purpose.

It may be objected that this test bears reference only to Confirmation. But Confirmation is in this Church the recognized and sufficient approach to full Church membership! Once more, let it be understood that there is here no disparagement of the composition of the test, though the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the Church Catechism might strike some as being of unequal merit for such a juxtaposition. But a little further back in the same service there occurs, perhaps, the best description of the Christian religion ever worded: "Our profession is to follow the example of our Saviour Christ and to be made like unto Him." Is it seriously supposed by the authorities of the Church of England that anyone "able to say the Creed," etc., is thereby qualified to undertake a profession which, considering the Life on which it is modelled, is the most difficult in the whole world!

If candidature for such a profession carries with it no training in discipleship, will some authoritative person inform us what has become of the mandate Christ delivered to His Apostles?

In all Christendom is there no authority that says to the enquirer or to the growing child pledged by his sponsors to the Christian profession: "Before you profess Christianity, will you take the Gospels and read them and ponder them and think about your own life and the life around you in the light of them, and *let Jesus Christ show you how to live?* And when you have done this and the secret of His life has disclosed itself to you, and you have found the spring of all action and all submission where Christ found it, and are set upon living as a child of God by the spirit of Jesus, then come and find in the fellowship of those like-minded, and in the sacraments and aids Christ instituted, the realization of the manhood or womanhood to which God through life calls you."

The facts being what they are, must it not be admitted that the Church, the society in trust to carry out the Will of Jesus Christ as committed to His Apostles, has shirked one half of His parting injunction? This is a grave indictment. But why not face it if it offers the key to the present desperate state of Christianity both in the eyes of the world and in the light of its own conscience? Why go on adding to the numerical "strength" of a society which cannot function as its Founder intended because not operated according to His Will? Why not face the fact that whole populations have been and are being baptized into forgetfulness of Jesus Christ? Years ago Mr. Chesterton said a thing unforgettably true: "Christianity has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and left untried." But Mr. Chesterton omitted to add where the responsibility lay. It lies not with those who have held aloof, nor even with those who have derided the claims of the Master. It lies with those who have found it difficult to carry His mandate into effect and have dared to think that partial obedience could procure the result He designed. To baptize is not difficult; to instruct the baptized in observances is not arduous; to get men and women to share the standpoint of Jesus Christ, to get and to apply His values, to submit their lives daily to His motive—this has been found difficult and has been left untried.

THOMAS J. HARDY.

THE MIND AND THE HEART—I*

ONE day, during the Great War, I was waiting in a baker's shop in a town in the North of France, when a British "Tommy" entered. He went straight to the window, helped himself to a loaf, took it to the girl at the counter, put down his money, and without having uttered a syllable departed. He thus circumvented the tiresome question of language. I wish that I could do the same now, for the particular matters about which I have to speak are greatly embarrassed by difficulties of terminology. There are a dozen senses or more which have been, and still are, applied to the words "mind" and "heart." Since, however, I cannot do what the soldier did, and avoid the question of terms altogether, I propose to do the next best thing, and that is to state dogmatically what meaning I purpose to attach to them in the present discussion, and to leave the matter there. It would take too long to attempt to justify one use of the terms as against another, whether by appealing to historical or to psychological considerations, and it is hardly likely even so that any solid advantage would be gained.

Starting, then, from the familiar threefold analysis of psychic activity into cognition, feeling-tone, and conation, I would reserve the use of the term "mind" for the first named, and employ the word "heart" to denote all that is covered by the other two. In this way, perhaps, we shall be doing no great violence to the popular usage of the words. At the same time it is clear that certain aspects of the problem are thereby entirely ignored. For example, nothing is said of the immensely important question of temperament, which has a close bearing on the subject.

Now while the present state of our psychological knowledge leaves us almost entirely in the dark concerning the nature of the mind and of the heart (perhaps it always will) it has, nevertheless, thrown much light upon the mutual relation of the two. They may be x and y respectively, but at any rate we have been able to arrive at certain formulæ which hold good concerning the relation between them. It is with the problem of the relation between them that we shall be concerned in the present paper. I would suggest that there are two principles or laws of first-rate importance which have of recent years come to light. Let us call them (*a*) the principle of the priority of the heart, and (*b*) the principle of the multiplicity of the heart. We may formulate the first as follows: In the develop-

* A paper read at the Conference on Adult Religious Education at High Leigh, May 28-30, 1929.

ment of the human psyche, the influence of the heart is necessarily all-powerful at the first, and in a large proportion of instances it tends to be the determining factor all through. The other law we state thus: The heart must not be thought of as being unitary; it is a manifold, consisting of a varying number of distinct centres of psychic energy. This multiplicity is reflected on the mental plane.

We turn first to examine (*a*). The effect of the emergence of this law is considerably to modify the truth of the dictum, "Man is a rational animal." It has, in fact, led to what is hardly less than a revolution in psychological thought. And it has been a sudden revolution withal. The late Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, for example, records the horror with which he discovered in 1919 that a syllabus in psychological medicine which he drew up just prior to the war contained no reference at all to instinct.* According to this principle, then, man is from the first by a necessity of his nature governed by his heart. The baby in arms may not have much intelligence, or many powers of cognition, but he has a psychological heart which is lusty and strong. He knows all there is to know from the first about pleasure and pain, as may be discovered by performing the simple experiment of sticking a pin into him. That is to say, he knows what he likes and what he does not like, and his conational abilities are exercised towards the former and away from the latter. His powers of speech being confined to different species of wailing, it is a little difficult for some people to realize this. It is nevertheless true that the utterances of the babe when its desires are not granted are not psychologically essentially different from those of the retired colonel who explodes upon the golf course when his purposes are frustrated. This kinship is revealed to those who have eyes to see in the fact that, while the latter no doubt prides himself unconsciously on the quality —*i.e.*, the variety—of his language, the only really essential part of it is its quantity. To return to the baby, we see that habits of pleasure and pain reaction are soon formed in the child, and these produce what is called its disposition. By the time it is four or five years old this has been formed. By then the child will be either egoistic or altruistic, either timid or courageous, either slothful or industrious. All this, be it carefully observed, is a matter of the heart.

Fully conscious reason or Mind, on the other hand, is comparatively late on the scene. By the time she appears, not only is the plan of the play revealed, but the first act is over. What is the Mind to do? What part shall she play? Speaking broadly, she can do one of two things. The first alternative

* *Psychology and Politics*, p. 4.

before her is to fall completely into line, without making any attempt, or at any rate any serious attempt, to modify the plan formulated by the Heart, which hitherto has dominated the scene. If she does this, then we have the procedure which is very familiar to all of us—namely, rationalization. Mind is suffered to remain on the stage as much as she likes, and to say what she likes, so long as she does nothing to upset the course of the plot. Clearly, under these circumstances, her best plan will be to find an outlet for her energies by throwing herself enthusiastically into it and by thus making the play as successful as she can. Nevertheless this is the suicide of the Mind; or, rather, it is something even worse, it is abject slavery for her. She is in the humiliating position of following in the train of the triumphant desires which have carried her captive.

The other broad alternative before the Mind is for her to lift up her voice in protest. In this case, one of three things may happen. (*a*) She may be summarily sent off the stage by the Heart, and then she may "kick up a row" behind the scenes. This is technically known as repression. (*b*) She may be sent off the stage, but, instead of going alone, she may take one or more other members of the company with her. When they get behind the scenes they make no noise, but they quietly perform a little play on their own. Yet although there is no noise, the main play is hopelessly crippled by the absence of so many of the players. This is what is known as dissociation. (*c*) She may succeed in staying on the stage and gaining a hearing. In this case, it is clear that she will considerably alter the plan and plot of the play. How will she alter it? I answer, by bringing it into conformity with reality.

This, I take it, is the essential function of the Mind. It is to cause the Heart to conform with reality. For the Heart, if left to its own devices, causes the psyche to soar in a region of unrestrained desire, wherein it loses all contact with the *terra firma* of reality. It is the function of the Mind to bring it down to earth and to hard fact. It may be described as the ballast of the Heart. It does this, to employ the terminology given us by Freud, by causing the psyche to turn from the pleasure principle to the reality principle. It is, however, faced by a serious difficulty, which puts it at a grave disadvantage from the first. It can only bring the Heart into conformity with reality by means of the Heart itself. In the language of our original parable, it can only stay on the stage by the permission of the Heart. That is to say, it must in some way "get round" the Heart. Once having gained this vantage, and once having been given permission to lift up its voice on the stage, it then has some chance, at any rate, of remaining on

throughout the rest of the play, although it is always liable to be silenced and cried down if it utters sentiments which the Heart does not find to its liking. In comparatively few lives do the Mind and the Heart occupy the stage on equal terms, and together fashion a play which, being a true work of art, is a thing of beauty and a joy for ever.

We must now enquire more precisely how Mind performs this task of bringing the Heart into line with reality. She may adopt either of two methods. (*a*) She may employ the discursive method of science; (*b*) she may use the method of direct intuitive experience. Whichever method the Mind adopts, she is dependent, as we have seen, upon the permission of the Heart for any *locus standi*. The evidence for this is the existence of lunatic asylums. There you have collections of persons whose Hearts have not suffered their Minds to have any secure resting place. Unfortunately, however, not only those inhabiting such places of detention are lunatics. From the point of view of psychology, the people there are somewhat arbitrarily separated from other folk who are dominated by their Hearts, simply because in their case the Heart causes them to be a danger to themselves or to the public.

We may best explain the two methods by which the Mind makes contact with reality by means of one or two examples. As an illustration of what we have called the discursive method, we may take the supposed case of a very fat lady whose Heart prompts in her the phantasy that she weighs only ten stone. She is persuaded to step on to a weighing machine; the scale is turned at fourteen. If the effect of this is to cause her to fulminate against the inaccuracy of weighing machines in general, and of this one in particular, we may not write her down as rational. Nevertheless, unless she is very far gone, she can be made to abandon the view that she is only ten stone in weight. For the verdict of the weighing machine can be substantiated by that of other weighing machines, and they in their turn can be supported by rigid mathematical argument.

As a somewhat different kind of example of the discursive method by which the Mind makes contact with reality, let us take the case of a man who believes that the world was made in six days, on the evidence of his Heart, which is firmly attached to the Bible. If such a man takes to the study of geology, the first fossil he meets should lead him to abandon the phantasy and bring him down to earth. In the case of a truly rational man who is plastic to experience this is what will happen. How overwhelmingly strong is the influence of the Heart, however, is convincingly shown in the case of Philip Gosse, who, when as a geologist he was faced with this situation, boldly

escaped from the impasse by means of the rationalization that God made the fossils as they now are, and put them into the earth. Thus did the stalwart Heart of the geologist put to flight all the hosts of geological science.

The other method open to the Mind in order to bring the Heart into contact with reality is the more immediate one of intuitive experience. As an instance of this we may suppose the case of a man whose embittered Heart has made him into a professed atheist. Such a man, let us imagine, witnesses the dying confession of a Christian martyr. In a flash he perceives the numinous, as Otto would say, and his atheism is gone. It is experience of this kind which gives rise to the proverb (by no means universally true) that seeing is believing.

Now when we compare these two methods of the Mind we observe that in the case of the first it is possible to employ a chain of scientific reasoning to demonstrate that the Mind is out of touch with reality, and that its arguments are rationalizations. Nevertheless, the Heart can still continue to hold the stage, if it chooses, as it did in the case of Gosse. Many amusing situations are created by this peculiarity of the Heart, such as the well-known one of the ardent Fundamentalist and teetotal enthusiast who, when confronted with the text, "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake," insisted that St. Paul meant, "Rub it on the outside." In strictness, it is only in cases which can be reduced to mathematical formulæ that the Heart can be forcibly dethroned, and even then there is the drawback that the Mind probably will be unable to follow the argument!

Must we conclude, then, that we can have certain contact with reality through the Mind only by means of mathematics? Hardly, for although it is true that science and philosophy rest upon certain postulates, they are postulates of the Mind rather than postulates of the Heart. In so far as science or philosophy can substantiate the validity of a belief, then we are entitled to hold that we have at any rate some contact with reality. It follows from this that in the last resort the Mind must rely upon the discursive method. The intuitive method is valid only on the tacit understanding that any given experience is capable of being integrated with the rest of experience. No doubt, in the present state of our knowledge we see not all things yet integrated thus, but the whole framework of science presupposes that this is due to the incompleteness of that knowledge. In the end, the realms of experience and of abstract science must be one.

We may now turn to consider the Principle of the Multiplicity of the Heart. According to this, the Heart is not so much

a unit as a manifold. Every individual comes into the world as a bundle of strivings. These strivings, although altogether mysterious to us, appear to be definitely orientated in specific directions. These different directions we have labelled "instincts." Thus there is an instinct of hunger which causes the striving to reach out after food and to consume it; there is an instinct of curiosity which leads the organism to turn towards and to explore any novel object, and so forth. We may perhaps represent the matter diagrammatically as follows. The life of the organism, we have said, is a striving, variously called *élan vital*, horme, urge, libido, or psychic energy. The organism itself may be likened to a number of horizontal pipes which converge inwardly and meet in a common well or basin, whence the energy springs. These pipes extend outwardly in the directions of the several instincts. When an appropriate object appears opposite any of the pipes, the psychic energy is sucked along the pipe or pipes in question with a force proportionate to the strength of the stimulus. In so doing it tends to suck the energy from the other pipes, and thus to inhibit the operation of the other instincts. This is McDougall's well-known law of inhibition by drainage. But there also seems to be inhibition by blocking. That is to say, in any given individual not all the pipes of the several instincts are free and open. Some of them are partially, if not wholly, blocked from the first, as a result of hereditary influences, which, however, at present are entirely obscure. In such cases it is evident that a greater power of suction is required to produce any response from the organism.

In order that a stable condition may be induced in the organism, what is required is an all-round uniform stimulus which will produce a steady flow of energy, or libido, along all the various channels. Such a stimulus, I would suggest, is provided by one source only—namely, God Himself. The simplest way of understanding this seems to be to suppose that there is one main and central pipe which represents a specific religious instinct, and that when there is a regular and easy flow of energy along this channel, a smooth and easy flow is sympathetically induced along the other waterways of the psyche as well. But if exception is taken to the hypothesis of a religious instinct, then we must suppose that the stimulus of the Divine in some way has the power of attracting all the several instincts in combination and of harmonizing them.

In the case of a perfect human being a state of complete harmony and rhythm would be attained. In such an instance it would be true to say that he had *a* heart. In average human nature, however, this is far from being the case. A man has

as many hearts as he has interests. He has a heart for his business, a heart for his home, a heart for golf, a heart for the whisky bottle, and (possibly) a heart for religion, and these hearts do not always agree together. Hence the familiar phenomenon which is commonly known as the separating up of one's life into water-tight compartments.

These different hearts are usually known, after Shand, as sentiments. In the language of our parable, they represent strong and swirling currents of libido which surge backwards and forwards along the channels of the several instincts. We may develop the figure in order to explain the position occupied by the sentiments by saying that the effect of a strong flow of libido through any given channel is little by little to tilt the pipe in such a way as to increase the force of the libido along that channel, and to *incline* it to seek the same channel more readily in the future. Sentiments in this case will be diagrammatically represented by a greater or a lesser tilting, or inclination, of the pipes representing the instincts concerned.

It is the claim of our Lord that He can cleanse the very springs of the soul so that the water of life wells up and flows smoothly and easily along its several channels. Thus we see that life is essentially an emptying, a *kenosis*. We must not forget this when we seek to interpret the saying of St. Paul that our Lord "emptied Himself" at the Incarnation. Had it been remembered, perhaps some of the extreme "kenotic" theories would never have arisen. The familiar lines express a sound psychology:

> **Measure thy life by loss instead of gain,**
> **Not by the wine drunk, but the wine poured forth;**
> **For love's strength standeth in love's sacrifice.**
>
> **L. DEWAR.**

(To be concluded.)

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We have received a copy of *The Occasional Prayers in the 1928 Book Reconsidered*, by the Rev. E. Milner-White, Dean of King's College, Cambridge (S.P.C.K., 2s.). The 1928 Prayers and the author's revisions are printed in parallel columns; while a marginal column on the left contains criticisms of the former, and another on the right of the page contains explanations of the latter. We desire warmly to commend this volume to our readers. In every case the revision seems to us a real improvement, especially so far as rhythm and diction are concerned; and one is forced to wonder why a small body of men of letters was not called in to criticize the new prayers from the literary standpoint before they were submitted to Convocation. One of the advantages of the present position, however, is that revisions of this kind can be used at once in church without difficulty, all the more as the author and publishers give free permission to reprint the revisions.

On two points of fact perhaps a word may be said in the interests of accuracy. The prayer "Remember, O Lord, what thou hast wrought in us," etc., was adapted from the Leonine original by Dr. Armitage Robinson, now Dean of Wells, and published, we understand, for use at the time of the Welsh Disestablishment controversy. The prayer "O Lord, support us all the day long," etc., is not, as commonly supposed, a sixteenth or even a seventeenth century prayer, but occurs at the close of one of Newman's sermons, and was presumably his own composition for the occasion. One can well imagine it coming from the hand that wrote "Lead, kindly Light." That is not to say that it is a good prayer; and we are grateful to Mr. Milner-White for replacing it by the fine prayer of Ignatius Loyola, "Teach us, good Lord, to serve thee as thou deservest," etc.

The Bishop of Durham and Disestablishment is the title of an exceedingly able pamphlet by Professor N. P. Williams, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford, on the subject of Church and State (Church Self-Government League, 6d. net). The Bishop of Durham's Charge, to which this pamphlet is a reply, was reviewed in these columns last month, and has attracted widespread attention. We believe, however, that Dr. Williams points to a more excellent way. He desires and expects change in the existing *nexus* between Church and State, but is opposed to Disestablishment on the ground that the concomitant Disendowment would greatly weaken the Church's work, and that the agelong recognition of Christianity by the nation would be brought to an end. Meantime he endorses the striking plea made by the Bishop of Chichester in Convocation last summer. "If the Church," he says, "instead of assuming that she is bound except where there is statutory evidence to the contrary, were to develop the habit of assuming that she is free except where there is statutory evidence to the contrary, many *faits accomplis* could be unostentatiously and unprovocatively created which would pave the way for the full legal recognition of her liberty." We believe that this is a principle of which more will be heard; and if it means that Convocation comes to play an increasingly important part in the Church's life, that is not a development which anyone need regret.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

St. John iii. 13.

THE latter part of St. John iii. 13, "even the Son of Man who is in heaven," assuming the words *ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ* to be genuine, has been the crux of commentators. Both Bishop Westcott and Archbishop Bernard would omit them, but, on the other hand, the majority of Continental writers—*e.g.*, Bauer, Heitmüller, Loisy, and Zahn—retain them, though Lagrange does so "not without hesitation." The Syriac and Western versions favour their retention, and ℵ,B,L,T^{u} 33 omit them. It has been objected that if the clause were part of the original text, it is not easy to account for its omission, but very early the difficulty may have been felt as to how the words could come from the lips of our Lord when He was on earth. Certainly the sentence would end very awkwardly with the words "the Son of Man"; the words "who is in heaven" seem to be necessary, as Loisy says, "pour que la phrase ne reste pas comme suspendue sur le vide." Assuming that they are genuine, how are we to explain them?

It is asserted that they do not contain any doctrine different from that of the Prologue as to the pre-existence of the Son (*cf.* i. 18). We submit, however, that those words imply more than the pre-existence of the Son: they indicate that in some sense Jesus, the Son of Man, was in heaven at the same time as He was living on earth.

Dr. Bernard says that if we retain the phrase we must interpret it as of "the timeless existence of the Son in the heavenly places, while yet He is manifested on earth. But this thought suggests later developments of Christology."

Another explanation occurs to us. Our Lord is still in heaven, although living on earth, even as the same may be said of His followers who abide in Him (Eph. ii. 6; Phil. iii. 20; *cf.* Heb. xii. 22-24). The words "He that came down from heaven" (John iii. 13) refer to the actual moment when He, the Eternal Son, took our human nature, and was made flesh and dwelt amongst us. The first part of the sentence, together with the exception, is rightly considered both by Bernard and Wellhausen to have no reference whatever to the Ascension. Should not the full force of the perfect tense be given to *ἀνεβέβηκεν*? Then the meaning of the verse would be, "No man hath ascended or is ascending into heaven save He, the Incarnate Son, who has descended from heaven, and is ever ascending into heaven (*cf.* i. 51), nay, who is actually in heaven." Our Lord when on earth did nothing of Himself, but only what He saw His Father doing. His face was ever turned towards the Father (v. 19, viii. 28); He ever heard His voice (v. 30; *cf.* xv. 15). The Father is ever with Him (viii. 29), and is in Him (xiv. 11, 20, xvii. 21), the Lord also abiding in His Father's love. Living under our earthly conditions, Christ is still in heaven, since He is not alone because of His uninterrupted communion with the Father (viii. 16, xvi. 32), though there are hints given of the cry of dereliction from the Cross when the Father Himself must veil His face from the Son of His love (*cf.* xii. 27, xiii. 21).

What is true of the Master is also true of His servants, only in the latter case their abiding in the Father is mediated by the Incarnate Son, and could not be effectuated until Jesus was glorified and the Holy Spirit given. By partaking of eternal life here and now the believer also is in

heaven. Christ, according to St. Paul, is the firstfruits of them that slept (1 Cor. xv. 20). He is also the firstfruits of those who, while still living on earth, are also in heaven, and St. John iii. 13 is the text which indicates this.

The following story will not be out of place here. "On a lonely moor in Scotland, far away from all houses, there lived not long ago a shepherd with his family. He was an old man past all work, blind, and laid up with rheumatism, so that he could not stir from his seat beside the lowly peat fire. To a pious visitor who came one day to see him, and spoke of the blessedness of heaven to cheer him, the old shepherd said, 'I know it well; I have been in that place during the last ten years.' And he told his visitor how, when he was converted ten years previously, it seemed to him as if all things had come new, and heaven had begun to him on earth, and he was lifted above all his troubles into a region of wonderful peace" (*cf. The Daisies of Nazareth*, by Hugh Macmillan, pp. 244, 245).

There is a Johannine ring about this experience: the old shepherd had passed from death into life (v. 24); he will taste of death, but not see it (viii. 51, 52), as he is already in heaven. Of the Incarnate Son it was true to say that He came down from heaven, but He was still in heaven.

W. H. Rigg.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Zeitschrift für die N.T.liche Wissenschaft. 1929. Heft 2.

E. Williger begins with an article on the structure of St. Augustine's Confessions. To the ten books usually printed the Saint adds Books XI.-XIII., a commentary on the first chapter of Genesis. The connecting link is the double sense of *Confessio—confiteri* (ἐξομολογεῖσθαι) being used = "to praise," as well as "to confess sin." Many passages in the first part prepare for the praise of God's work of creation found in the last part. E. von Dobschütz writes on the Church in Early Christianity. Until recently writers were unconsciously influenced by the *contrat social* view of human institutions and so read into the documents the conception of local societies that coalesced into one Church. The true view is of the people of the Lord, reinforced by newcomers from among the Gentiles, gathering round their Messianic Lord Jesus; the continuity between old and new is organic. But St. Paul at times expressed another view, by which the new, or true, Israel is contrasted with the old Israel according to the flesh.

W. Caspari writes on Sirach li., L. Schmid on John iv. But the outstanding article is by H. Windisch, on the Baptism of Children in Primitive Christendom. There were two tendencies, he says. The original, Jewish, view was to draw a distinction between the infant, who was sinless, and the growing child who shared the guilt of his elders. Not a word in the N.T. leads us to suppose that infants were baptised. They were considered holy, their primal innocence being a substitute for Baptism. The other view grew up in Gentile Christian circles, influenced by the ideas of mystery religions. Baptism put the child in a circle of grace, from which he must not be debarred. Eventually the second tendency prevailed, with the help of the developing belief in original sin. We shall probably be right in supposing that children in the Apostolic Age were baptised normally in the years seven to fourteen, and that they

were taught catechetically. All children past infancy, that is, were candidates for baptism, and doubtless they would be immediately baptised if in danger of death. W. K. L. C.

Ephemerides Theologicæ Lovanienses. October, 1929.

The place of honour in this number is devoted to an article on the doctrine of Cardinal Cajetan concerning original righteousness and sanctifying grace, between which the Cardinal noted a "real distinction." It is claimed that this is the correct teaching, supported by St. Thomas and by other authorities. A second paper deals with the question of justifiable homicide in the case of an unjust aggressor. There is also a very interesting note on the protest made by the great scholar Muratori (1672-1750) against exaggerated Marian devotions in the early eighteenth century. For instance, Muratori maintained that the Church's right to decree the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception as a dogma of Divine Faith depended upon the possibility of its clear deduction from Holy Scripture, and of a successful appeal to constant and prevailing patristic tradition. He objected also to all indiscreet devotional practices; it is dangerous to speak of Mary's "commands" in heaven. Her part is prayer, and the customary "Ora pro nobis" goes far enough. Many counter-protests were raised—*e.g.*, in Spain—but Pope Benedict XIV. could not be persuaded to censure the great scholar.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of this number for Anglican readers is a three-page review of the New Commentary. On the whole, it is a very favourable review. The format and good printing of the book are in pleasing contrast to certain others. The reviewer, however, demurs to the prominence of some too liberal ideas and to some sacrifices in the domain of history which are inconvenient when the corresponding religious questions come up for discussion. It is noted with satisfaction how much of the supernatural and traditional belief of the Church is retained in the New Testament section, though even here there are a few regrettable concessions to modern ideas. The episode of the Magi, for instance, is spoken of as *midrash*, and there are other points upon which a (Roman) Catholic commentator would have to say *non possumus*. Still, in view of the general wisdom of the treatment and of the real devotion displayed to the Person of our Blessed Lord, the Commentary will be of service not only to Anglican exegetes, but to all whose duty leads them to comment on Holy Scripture. It is good to note that the great dogmas of the Faith are in general preserved, such as Christ's virgin Conception and Birth and His real and bodily Resurrection. The reviewer adds that though the Commentary could not be called, as its writers suppose, "catholic," yet it is on the way to catholicity. It is evidence that in England much has been retained which other Reformed Churches on the Continent have lost. It is well that, in spite of defects, such a work should be encouraged.

There are many other reviews, and the usual full theological bibliography of recent publications. W. R. V. BRADE.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xx., No. 2.

Dr. Joseph Reider continues his useful survey of "Biblical Literature" since 1922 (in this article Old Testament only), ranging over a wide field—English, American, German, and French. In his comments on Ball's

The Book of Job he complains that Dr. Ball is too much under Sumerian influence, and gives too much confidence to the corrupt text of the LXX of Job, as well as treating with insufficient caution the "newly-formed metrical theories," this latter tendency causing the rejection of many essential words and passages. Dr. Reider quotes with approval Dr. C. F. Burney's noteworthy remarks in his preface to Ball's books: "Those of us who have worked for many years at the text of the Old Testament may have been responsible for the suggestion of a large number of emendations in corrupt and difficult passages; yet few, indeed, are the passages in which we can flatter ourselves that we have actually recovered the original, and settled the textual difficulties once and for all."

Professor James A. Montgomery reviews Dr. Gaster's *The Asatis, the Samaritan Book of the "Secrets of Moses,"* 1927, and Professor Gustaf Dalman's fine book on Palestine, *Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina*, 1928.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

British Museum Quarterly. Vol. iv., Nos. 1 and 2.

Many valuable exhibits recently acquired by the Museum are illustrated and described in these numbers. Among these are a collection of Sumerian seals, 3000-2000 B.C.; a painted kylix of the Amarna period, probably from al-Amarna; some early Persian pottery of about 2500 B.C. from Nihavand in Western Persia; and a basalt disk from Egypt, date about the latter half of the first century A.D., with a bust of the god Serapis in relief. Also several additions to the collection of pottery, the work of Persia and Syria in Islamic times, have recently been made. The Islamic pottery of the Near East already forms one of the most attractive series of exhibits in the Museum, and its interest has been enhanced by these latest additions.

Mention must be made of the remarkable exhibition of antiquities excavated at Ur during 1928-29. Specially notable are the four great lyres, and the goats of gold, silver, lapis-lazuli, and shell, each cropping the fruit of a plant of wood overlaid with gold, one of which has been restored and the other left in its crushed state as it was found.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

NOTE

THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION

WE seem almost to be reaching a point in the development of New Testament research when it requires a greater effort of faith to believe in the findings of "form-criticism" and the speculative theories concerning the first century of the Church than to hold to purely traditional views. The time has come, we are told, to abandon all claim to possessing an historic Jesus. There is not sufficient undisputed fact concerning Him to give us the matter for even an obituary notice. The Gospels depend on documents which are hopelessly lost. The life pictured in the synoptics is at such variance with that given by John, that if one is true the other is false. There are also difficulties arising out of the text and from translation that leave Him shadowy and uncertain, a quite unrecoverable person. Documentary evidence being so unsatisfactory, we must try to see Him through

the eyes of the first and second centuries. But here ingenuity appears to have excelled even that of the latest composer of "modern" music or the "form-criticism" of futurist design. If the Apostolic John never saw Asia, but was martyred at the same time as his brother, and St. Peter's connection with Rome is purely illusory; if St. Polycarp never had any connection with any John, Elder or Apostle, and the only really impartial historians are those removed by nearly nineteen hundred years from the times of which they write; if the Pastoral Epistles as we have them represent a point of view fifty years after the time of St. Paul, and 1 Peter has Aristion for its author, while the really reliable and genuine document of the first century is the uncanonical first Epistle of Clement; if St. Ignatius was neurotic, with a compensated inferiority complex, and St. Irenæus was whatever egocentricism is called by the psychologists; if the very scantiness of evidence for Alexandrian church order is the title to its value, just as the obscurity of the Papias quotations lends weight to their significance—then, indeed, we must not be surprised if the words of our Lord are really those of first- or second-century teachers, and the criterion of trustworthiness that of what, in the light of these new discoveries, the unknown authors may be supposed from what we do not know of them to have written. Which, of course, in turn becomes the criterion of what they ought to have penned. It is all extremely interesting and, no doubt, will continue to intrigue the elect until, like Traditionalism or Higher Criticism, the theories of Harnack or Schweitzer, having accomplished its mission, it gives way to something else—shall we say Buchmanism or a return to Catholic dogma? But the elect are few, and so long as the only two certainties that emerge are (1) that documents are not the product of those by whom they claim to be written, and (2) that the only trustworthy writings are those which have been rescued from an oblivion that perhaps they deserved, even though our gravamen be something exaggerated, it must be remembered that the demands upon the credulity of others may be more than they can meet.

Meanwhile, as the editor of a Canadian journal* very truly says: "It is true that the Christian Faith arose from an experience which was completed long before the Gospels were written. They were not written as lives of Him for unborn folk, but to preserve and purify a faith already in existence. They were composite, purposive works; pieces of special pleading. Having a definite, frankly stated purpose, their authors selected and rejected as best suited their purpose. They were not trained historians. The text is full of difficulties. But the Church insists that there is in the Gospels a truer picture of Jesus than could be given in a criticism-proof record of the events." Christian men and women find in the Gospels Him in whom they have believed, and while not denying that there is a venture in Faith, they do assert that there is a sufficient historic accuracy to make that venture the only wise choice. "They seek not the robes of Jesus, but the Lord Himself. The Gospel form is the supremely fitted vehicle to give this knowledge. Many of us have received an invitation to give for an encyclopædia of prominent Canadians the facts of our life. There was a sheet of questions to be answered: birth, education, marriage, positions held, books written, societies, etc.—all of which would be valuable to the poor wretch who wrote our obituary for a newspaper. The invitation also contained a sample page of the encyclopædia, and on it the

* *Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*, vol. 6, No. 4.

biography of a clergyman. He had held an immense number of obscure positions in the denomination he served. All was historically unimpeachable. There were also passed from mouth to mouth among his friends, and never written, two stories. One was that on a hot, dusty railway train he had taken a fretful babe from its tired mother without asking, and without interfering with his conversation with his brother minister, had put it to sleep and held it while it slept. The other was that, when his doctor told him he had but two months to live, he had said 'Oh, bully!' using a phrase of delight he had carried from his boyhood into his old age. These two stories meant everything, and revealed the true man as no history could. This the Gospels do for us. The men who wrote them were so dominated by Him and had so penetrated His inner life that they have been able to reveal to us the real life of Jesus, as no other life has ever been revealed. And deep answers to deep. Criticism comes and goes . . . but the power still abides. It comes to each in turn; it is interpreted by each in turn, and in the presence of it there are always those who fall down to worship and rise up to serve."

This "rising up to serve" takes us to another article in the same journal. If all serve, then who are the served? Is Christianity in fact a Democracy, or is it an Aristocracy of selected men and women capable of being entrusted with the stewardship of a high call? The question raised is so important, and the manner of answering it so stimulating, that somewhat extensive quotation seems permissive and advisable. "At present," says the writer, Professor E. F. Scott, "we have to reckon with that disposition to treat democracy as the final truth, in view of which religion itself must be interpreted. We are given to understand that at last the real key to the meaning of the Gospel has been found. In previous centuries our religion had not learned its own mind, but we must deal gently with Paul and Augustine and Luther and the other pioneers. They meant well; they had glimmerings of the truth; in stammering symbolic language they foretold the Fourth of July." That is worth quoting, is it not? But while it is well that the conscience of the Church should be kept wakeful, there is nothing in the teaching of Jesus that foreshadows democracy as the ideal and necessary order. He is not concerned with changing the framework of society, but with motives and principles. With His sincere vision, He recognized the fact of inequality. There would always be poor and ignorant, and He aimed, not at raising them into a false position, but at protecting them. Since all were brethren, the strong must support the weak, must use their advantage for the benefit of those who have none. "This is the Christian idea of brotherhood, and I fail to see how it involves the democratic fiction that all men are just on the same level, and must therefore decide every question by a count of heads. It is customary in these days to speak with bated breath of the 'average man.' His are the judgments we want to discover; to offend his standards or break any of his decrees is our modern form of high treason. Strangely enough, this worship of the average man is often imputed to Jesus—to whom it was utterly abhorrent. 'Woe unto you, average man!' is the real burden of His denunciations. What He demanded always was excellence; and if we cut that out of His Gospel we cut everything." Professor Scott then illustrates his thesis, and after showing that the unpardonable offence in the days when the Church was over against a pagan State lay in the fact that Christians were not democratic, but kept aloof and apart, he suggests that such is the real grievance

against the Church now. "It has always tried to help people; it has, indeed, been the only institution in former times or now, which has honestly been on their side. Yet the mass of the people have never liked it. Their resentment has always been traceable to the same cause—that this religion imposed a discipline which was beyond them, and which made it, in one form or another, the religion of a class. They have understood the genius of our religion much better than we sometimes do ourselves. In these days the Church has done everything possible to break down the old suspicions. It has declared itself the champion of democracy. . . . It has proclaimed the rights of everybody who chooses to whine about his condition." But far from having gained any gratitude or popularity by these attempts at conciliation, it has only made proletarian leaders its bitterest enemies. "We are always complaining about the millions who stand outside of the Church. We resort to all sorts of devices, often very paltry and questionable, to bring them in. We reckon by numbers, as in a political campaign, and come to the mournful conclusion that Christianity is a losing cause. One wonders sometimes whether we might not do better to expel from the Church at least half of the people who are now in it. A far smaller number of devoted souls, whose sincerity no one could doubt, would be a vastly stronger power for righteousness. In any case, the Church will serve democracy best by representing something different from it."

H. S. MARSHALL.

REVIEWS

NEW TESTAMENT PROBLEMS. By W. K. Lowther Clarke, D.D. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Lowther Clarke has been well advised to collect and reprint a number of articles on New Testament and allied themes from among his contributions to THEOLOGY and other journals during the past few years. He is in a unique position to keep abreast of the developments of scholarship in this field, and his surveys of recent literature are very stimulating. In this volume the reader will find impartially summarized and judiciously criticized the best and most suggestive work, particularly, though not exclusively, of German scholars, on such subjects as the Virgin Birth as a literary and historical problem, the new developments in Synoptic criticism known respectively as the *Formgeschichtlich* method and the Proto-Luke hypothesis, Christian and Greek miracle-stories, the economic background of the Bible, and the Mandæans, with the possible bearing of the Mandæan texts on the Fourth Gospel. The longer studies include an admirable review of Eduard Meyer's book on the origins of Christianity, a discussion of the early history of the Eucharist, and an historical essay on the practice of confession to laymen.

Dr. Clarke's power of getting the heart out of any book he reads is so considerable that he may easily leave his readers under the impression that here they are furnished with all they need to know. Dr. Clarke would be the first to warn them against such an assumption, but even if they cannot follow up the many avenues of inquiry and research which he throws open, they cannot but be grateful to one who places them *au courant* with so much that is living in the world of New Testament scholarship.

The longer articles are supplemented by a number of briefer exegetical notes on particular passages, together with shorter studies of themes like "The Marriage Feast at Cana," "Was St. Paul a stammerer?" "May we expect a religious revival?" In each case Dr. Clarke has something suggestive to say from a fresh angle.

To characterize a book whose contents are so varied is not easy. Fertility in suggestion, independence and clarity of judgment, a ready welcome for new theories and new evidence, coupled with a firm resolve to hold fast to that which is good, a quick eye for essentials—these qualities are in evidence throughout. Perhaps Dr. Clarke, who was commended to the S.P.C.K. by his Cambridge tutor as being more orthodox than he knew, is inclined to maintain orthodox traditional solutions

of historical problems too easily. I should not myself be satisfied with his positive treatment of the problem of the Virgin-Birth narratives. He assumes that St. Luke must have learnt the story perhaps as early as 59, and that reserve was necessary in disclosing this private tradition because it was liable to be associated with dangerous heathen myths. But what ground have we for supposing that the first Christians regarded these myths as myths or felt the association with such myths to be dangerous? Justin Martyr, at least, in his first *Apology*, C. 22, says, "If we even affirm that He was born of a virgin, accept this in common with what you accept of Perseus." Was the mentality of St. Paul's Gentile converts or of St. Luke himself very different from that of Justin? At least, Dr. Clarke's solution seems to assume in St. Luke and in the first disciples a mentality far too like our own. This assumption, though liable to mislead at one point, may illuminate at another, and Dr. Clarke's parallel between the collection of family traditions after the death of a parent and the formation of the traditions concerning Jesus seems to me to have real value.

It will add to the interest of this book for many readers that it is dedicated to Dr. Foakes-Jackson, whose services to Biblical scholarship and to the study of Church history have not been limited to his own published work, but have been continued in the many pupils who have been ripened into scholars by their good fortune in falling in with so stimulating a tutor. What his tuition meant in Cambridge may be learnt from Dr. Clarke's charming dedication.

H. G. Wood.

Christian Religious Experience. By the Rt. Rev. Arthur Chandler.

The Reformation and the People. By T. A. Lacey.

Problems of Providence. By Charles J. Shebbeare. Longmans, Green and Co. 2s. 6d. and 4s. each.

These are the first three volumes of a new series (The Anglican Library of Faith and Thought), published under the auspices of the Literature Committee of the English Church Union, and edited by the Rev. Leonard Prestige.

Their very varied character suggests that the series is intended to cover a wide field, and the Editorial Foreword describes its "general intention" as "a systematic treatment of some of the facts of religious experience and history." It may be said at once that if future volumes are up to the standard of these three the series will be a valuable and important one—and a remarkably cheap one: there are few books nowadays by first-rate authorities to be obtained for half a crown.

The books, says the Editorial Foreword, "are not technical handbooks, but aim at . . . the educated public." A good many even of the "educated" may find that Mr. Shebbeare's volume requires more than one reading if its argument is to be thoroughly appreciated, perhaps; and, in fact, he is careful to point out that he is not writing for babes in Christ. It is a closely reasoned defence, not only of the Argument from Design, with such revisions and modifications as are necessitated by modern knowledge, but of the belief in a special and particular divine providence. The argument cannot be summarized here: its conclusion is described by the author as "deterministic Optimism." The adjective indicates the main planks in the author's position. He seems to assume throughout that if we are to justify God's ways to man we must show that the world as we know it (the world in which evil is a fact) is not merely the best world for the production of that fellowship and co-operation of man with God which are also facts, but the best world conceivable in an absolute sense. There are obvious difficulties for this view in the appearance of human freedom and in the dominance of law in the physical world. These difficulties the author meets, first, by the doctrine of Universalism; and, secondly, by a view of God's government of the world which unites "in a single scheme both rules which can be mathematically formulated and also systematic and detailed provision for the minute wants and needs of mankind": the Universe must be "as necessary as Fate," if also "as personal as we are ourselves." Mr. Shebbeare puts the case against even a highly modified "libertarianism" with great force, though the impassioned, emotional tone of some passages suggests that he is sometimes arguing to convince himself as well as the reader. A final reconciliation of God's foreknowledge with man's freedom is obviously unattainable by finite minds. But many readers, though having no easy solution of their own to offer, will boggle at Mr. Shebbeare's. The difficulties are surely immense. "Is there," he asks, "anything contradictory in recognizing my own evil choice for the evil thing it is, and yet allowing that God, for wise ulterior purposes, may be the cause of it?" We think there is; it does seem "contradictory" to say that rebellion against God's purpose is part of that purpose. Nor could we assent to the view that sin is not too high a price to pay for the joy of repentance. In the Preface (a very frank and moving piece of autobiography) Mr. Shebbeare speaks of himself as not infrequently "more confident of his right to use impersonal than to use personal language in speaking of" his own religious experience; and later on asks for "a school of preachers who shall insist . . . that, even if Jesus is only a Character in a Book, that Book

(or rather that Character in it) has none the less saved our souls. . . ." We cannot escape the conclusion (though the Preface expressly warns the reviewer off it !) that the author's apparently less-than-Christocentric philosophy, and his consequent tendency to think of God as "the Good" or "the Moral Law," or (in Hegelian phraseology) "necessity conscious of itself," rather than as Love or in boldly personal terms, have the effect of seriously weakening some of his arguments.

It has seemed better to devote the space at our disposal to the consideration of one of these volumes than to attempt a necessarily scrappy account of all three. Readers of Bishop Chandler's previous works on ascetical theology will come with high expectations to *Christian Religious Experience*—expectations which will be more than satisfied by Part II., while Part I. provides an illuminating account of the nature of Christian Experience, and a vindication (against the "new" psychologists and others) of its validity.

Canon Lacey, in *The Reformation and the People*, covers an immense ground in a little over a hundred pages without ever seeming hasty or superficial. The greater part of his space he devotes to England, but, rightly insisting that "England and the English people made no original contribution to the movement," he is at pains to give a compressed and lucid and informative account of its continental beginnings, and particularly of Calvinism—Calvin's being, in his view, "the one master-mind of the Reformation." The conclusion of the whole matter is summed up in a few sentences whose terseness and individuality are characteristic of the whole book: "The aim of the Reformation was the amendment of the whole Catholic Church. The objective has been missed; mainly, I think, through a wilful breaking away from history. Therefore, the Reformation has been a tragic failure."

C. E. HUDSON.

NOTICES

CATHOLICISM AND CHRISTIANITY. By C. J. Cadoux, D.D. Longmans. 21s. net.

Dr. Cadoux has written a long and important book. In some respects it might have been more important if it had been briefer. He has compiled a regular armoury of references against Roman and, to some extent, Anglican conceptions of Catholicism. But he has not entirely resisted, we feel, the temptation to overload his case with detailed references, which render it difficult at times to see the wood for the trees. To some extent we may plead that our delay in reviewing his book is his own

fault. If there had not been quite so much of it, the task would have been an easier one.

Further, there are many of his criticisms of Anglo-Catholicism to which we must plead not guilty. Not that he is guilty of deliberate misrepresentation. It may be doubted whether any Protestant writer has ever approached Catholicism with more sympathy or freedom from prejudice. It is unfortunate that there are comparatively few expositions of the Anglo-Catholic position of recent date which can claim to be more than partial statements on particular aspects of Catholic faith and practice; while those that are extant are often comparatively personal expressions of opinion which others would repudiate. Hence he is at times inclined to overlook the extent to which recent developments of Anglo-Catholicism have moved away from the more rigid standards of the Tractarians. And in general he is more concerned with the attitude of the Roman Church. Naturally we do not quarrel with him for doing so; but equally naturally we are not so much interested in the quarrel between Progressive Protestantism (as he describes his own position) and Rome as in his quarrel with ourselves. For instance, we have no quarrel with his rejection of the conception of infallibility, if infallibility be understood as meaning the possession by the Church of some organ through which it can lay down at any given moment an oracular statement of the truth. And if it be limited to faith that the Holy Ghost will in the long run (perhaps only after centuries) guide the whole Church into the fulness of truth, and enable it to reject error, however old-established and venerable, we imagine that Dr. Cadoux would himself believe that in the last resort the Church will prove to be infallible.

Nor have we any quarrel with his contention that in Christianity the ultimate authorities are, and must in the nature of things be, on the one hand the Person of Our Lord Himself, and on the other the private judgment of the individual as enlightened and guided by the Holy Spirit. He refers to the latter authority as the Inner Light, and theologically he is no doubt correct; but at the same time we prefer to speak of the private judgment, since the "Inner Light" suggests an element of mystical experience which is not necessarily to be found in the religious life of the individual Christian.

Nor do we need to quarrel with much of his treatment of the authority of the Church. He admits that the faith and teaching of the whole Christian body has a right to the assent of the individual, in the sense that he ought to recognize that there is a very high degree of probability that the corporate judgment of the Society is more near the truth than that of the individual can normally hope to be. Further, he is undoubtedly right in his claim that the Church should ideally include the whole body of Christian believers, and that it should therefore open its doors as widely as possible, excluding none whom it can possibly admit. He rightly rejects the analogy of a club which has the right to make what rules it likes for its members. The Church can only insist on the minimum of essential beliefs, and exclude none who desire to enter its fellowship on these terms.

The argument is fatal as against the general Roman Catholic position. It is fatal, not so much because Rome would deny his claim, but because in practice it is entirely impossible to find out what you do or do not commit yourself to by accepting the claims of the Holy See. The

attractiveness of Rome to the ordinary man lies in her claim to teach you precisely what you are bound to believe, and her willingness within certain limits to minimize that amount. But there is a vast quantity which you are bound to accept with deference, merely because it is propounded by an authority which claims obedience, without risking itself to the extent of guaranteeing its absolute truth; and you have no real means of ascertaining which parts of the whole are in the last resort propounded infallibly or only by the authority which claims your deference.

It is, however, on the positive side that Dr. Cadoux's arguments are less satisfactory. He will have no imposition of Creeds as a test of membership of the Church. They may be put forward as summaries of what the Church believes, but no assent is to be required to them.

"The only condition of mutual membership which Christians are entitled to exact from Christians, and which the Church is entitled to demand from candidates for membership, is the expressed wish for that membership, public avowal of faith in Jesus Christ, and acceptance of whatever that may be found to involve in the search for truth in belief and for righteousness in life."

Against the objection that this is in fact to demand a credal test Dr. Cadoux replies "that it is simply a statement of the condition of things without which the question of the terms on which a man should not be admitted to Church-membership simply would not arise; and, in the second place, that, not being in any sense an elaborated intellectual statement, it is not open to the objections that we have raised against credal tests in the normal sense of the term."

Since in some sense all would admit that any baptized believer in Christ is a Christian, it is the duty of the Church to draw the necessary inference that all such persons are members of the Church, and "entitled to the right hand of fellowship and a place by our side at the table of our common Master."

Now it is easy to laugh at this position from the traditional and orthodox point of view, which has been brought up to believe that all heretics are very wicked men, who ought to be avoided more scrupulously than the vilest of sinners. But that view suffers from being patently contrary to the facts. Nobody really believes that all heretics are very wicked. Those who really care for the unity of Christendom must recognize that the burden of proof rests on them if they are to continue to refuse their assent to a demand for unity urged in the spirit of Dr. Cadoux's book. It may be true that he does not himself always live up to his professions of toleration for others; in other words, that he is not completely free from Protestant prejudices. But to a remarkable extent he has really succeeded in freeing himself. And it is necessary for those who cannot accept his view to state their reasons for rejecting it with an equal measure of candour and an equal freedom from prejudice.

And our first reason for suspecting Dr. Cadoux's solution of the problem of the division of Christendom is that it suffers from the same handicap as ultra-montane Romanism of being a completely logical system. Rome, as represented by the ultra-montane, is perfectly logical; you have a divine revelation expounded by a Living Voice, whose utterances tell you precisely what you are bound to believe and practise. Dr. Cadoux tells us that you may believe and practise what you like. Rome abolishes

private judgment except for the one purpose of accepting her claims; the function of private judgment is to commit the one supreme act of *hara-kiri*: Dr. Cadoux makes it in the last resort the only court of appeal. We always suspect a completely logical system in matters of practical life; a completely logical system is normally a *reductio ad absurdum*. And in the present instance it is manifestly so. For Dr. Cadoux, however much he tries to be fair to Catholicism, cannot in the end get away from protesting against those parts of it which he dislikes. And we fear that he is as rare among Free Churchmen as are those among Roman Catholics who can recognize the value of Protestantism. The idea of a rigidly exclusive Church breaks down in virtue of the fact that it excludes so many who are obviously Christians and obviously saints. The idea of an all-inclusive Church would break down if it were ever tried in practice, owing to the inability of its members to tolerate the beliefs and practices of some section of their fellow-members. The attitude of the Free Churches to the Prayer Book controversy is a sign of the distance of the bulk of their members from Dr. Cadoux's wide spirit of toleration.

And this leads us on to our second and main objection. Ultimately the differences between the two historical systems of Catholicism and Protestantism are too far-reaching for their union in a visible Church. For the Catholic religion must be a supernatural gift of God, coming to him through the Church as a divinely constituted Kingdom of God on earth, and centred in a ministry with a divine commission, and a sacramental system by which the divine life communicates itself to him. He must indeed use his own personal effort in the spiritual life to make himself worthy to receive the divine gift, but still the gift that he receives is something essentially different from and greater than his own personal moral and spiritual efforts. "Progressive Protestantism," as represented by Dr. Cadoux, although it would not in theory deny the presence of the supernatural side, is none the less primarily concerned to regard Christianity as an ethical system, based on the personal example of our Lord; it has in Him a divine sanction, but is none the less far more an effort of man to attain to God than a condescension of God to man.

It is for this reason that the controversy as to the necessity of the Apostolic succession is a real controversy with a live issue, not a mere struggle over outward forms. The historic episcopate in itself is not the matter of vital importance: the vital point about it is that it is a symbol of the belief that the Church is primarily not of human origin, but of divine establishment, the kingdom of God on earth, the heavenly city coming down from God out of heaven.

It is here in particular that the difficulty arises in regard to Dr. Cadoux's logical conclusion "if members of the Church, then entitled to a place by our side at the table of our common Master." If the Eucharist were simply a memorial meal and a mark of brotherly love between Christians, his conclusion would be irresistible. We are not concerned to deny to Free Churchmen the title of Christians; we are not concerned to "unchurch" them. It is true that Anglo-Catholics regard communion with the historic episcopate as an essential mark of the true Church; but we are inclined to doubt whether too much emphasis has not been laid on this particular point. We should be inclined to suggest that it should be considered not so much an essential mark of the Church as a limit beyond which we regard it as unsafe to go, leaving it to God to decide—as He

alone can—in what sense our fellow-Christians of the Free Churches are members of the Church. But it is precisely because the Eucharist is to them so much less than it is to us that we dare not pass beyond common prayer and common work to the final point of communion with them. Not, of course, that we simply refuse on the ground of a difference of Eucharistic belief, in which the Free Churchman's position may be scarcely different from that of many Anglican Evangelicals. But in this matter the difference between his belief and ours is a symptom of a different conception of the whole nature of the Church and the Sacraments. What to him seems a natural step on the road to that unity which we desire no less than he does is to us a final and crowning point in the whole effort for Christian unity. To him the Church is a society of men who seek to serve a common Master; to us it is a gift of God to the world, whose structure and means of grace it is not in man's power to alter.

We would not, however, end on a note of opposition. In Dr. Cadoux's book there is a spirit of conciliation which Anglo-Catholics will do well to acknowledge. How far he speaks for Free Churchmen in general we cannot say. But if they on their side will learn to meet us in the spirit which he shows, and if we on our side are prepared to think out the meaning of our faith and practice in a spirit as liberal as his, the time of reunion will be nearer, even though we cannot expect that when it comes it will take any form that we can foresee. It is, perhaps, in the fact that Dr. Cadoux recognizes this impossibility that we see the clearest hope that reunion will come.

WILFRED L. KNOX.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND. Vol. IV. The Victorian Age, 1834-1910. By Alice D. Greenwood. Sheldon Press. 6s.

Our first duty—and also our first pleasure—is heartily to congratulate Miss Greenwood on the accomplishment of the task she began. She has in the comparatively short compass of four volumes narrated with spirit and with insight the history of the English people from the earliest times to 1910. Perhaps she thinks that we can scarcely as yet tell the story of the last twenty years, and in truth there is much in this contention. In all her volumes she is every whit as much concerned with *idées-forces* as with facts, and this is all to the good, for unless we grasp, as she has grasped, the ideas lying in the background we cannot possibly hope to understand the course of events. The admirable feature in her last volume is the care with which she handles the intellectual forces at work throughout the Victorian age, which she soundly appreciates. Let any reader turn to her thoughtful chapters on the reforms of the thirties, the Factory Acts, the intellectual and moral forces in Church and State, notably in education, and the three chapters on the Imperialist outlook, and he will at once perceive not only what happened, but also why it happened. Now this is really a remarkable achievement. Nor is it the least of her merits that she shows what the Church of England has achieved, and her achievement is really related to the achievements of the nation at large.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

PASCAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By Clement C. J. Webb. Oxford University Press. 6s.

These lectures by Professor Webb are so rich in learning and suggestion that they should be read by all who love Pascal. There will be

some, however, who will question whether the author of the *Pensées* is actually placed so high among philosophers in France as Professor Webb, relying on a recent book of Professor Chevallier, believes, and whether the challenge to his claims is necessary. Of all the great writers of the seventeenth century not one, admittedly, retains an influence that will compare with his, but those who revere the name of Pascal most may, perhaps, be least concerned as to its place in any special category.

It is particularly the Pascal of the *Pensées* with whom these lectures deal; the Pascal usually considered against the background of Port Royal is set side by side with Kant and with Descartes, defended carefully from the charges of Voltaire, and compared with William James. Under these conditions he can be seen afresh and in new light. Perhaps in the "Wager" lecture Professor Webb hardly makes full allowance for bygone ways of thought. Something so like this notorious "Pari de Pascal" may be found in the sermons of Bourdaloue and Bossuet and François de Sales, and the last pages of the austere *Logique de Port Royal* contain the same arguments. But at any period its appeal would have less effect upon the English mind, and here, as in deeper matters, an Englishman is at a disadvantage. In his development and in his writings Pascal belongs to France.

"To study his philosophy," wrote Victor Giraud, "is not merely following a train of thought; it is watching a soul come to life."

The English student will approach him from a different angle. This does not mean that English scholars have no contribution to make to knowledge of him, or that they are chary of respect, but perhaps they will hardly achieve entire understanding. Professor Webb acknowledges that his subject is not "especially sympathetic" to him, and the sense that Pascal needs more sympathy than he is accorded in this scholarly study is the one hindrance to complete enjoyment of it.

E. K. SANDERS.

THE BISHOP'S REGISTER. With Introductions and Notes. By Clifford J. Offer. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

Until the beginning of this century few, even of scholars and historians, had studied the pre-Reformation registers of the English Bishops. Bishop Stubbs, indeed, when Rector of Navestock, had searched every available register for references to be used in his *Registrum Sacrum Anglicanum*, published in 1858. And Canon Raine, in 1872, had selected *Letters from Northern Registers*: and in 1887 Prebendary Hingeston-Randolph commenced his great work on the Exeter registers, which lasted until his death. But it was only in 1904 that the Canterbury and York Society started that systematic publication of the registers of the two provinces which is still proceeding.

Being in Latin, of course, these works can only be of use to scholars and specialists. And so, for the ordinary reader who wishes to have some idea of the nature and contents of a medieval espiscopal register, Mr. Offer has made a selection of typical and interesting entries, which he presents in an English translation, with Introductions and Notes. The work is divided into three sections: (1) Documents illustrating the "religious" life —*i.e.*, in monastic houses; (2) documents administrative and parochial; (3) miscellaneous documents.

In each of these sections Mr. Offer has translated entries admirably

calculated to throw light upon episcopal activity in the Middle Ages. He gives the contemporary accounts of Visitations of the Bishop to abbeys and priories—where sometimes, as at Wigmore, there were very serious irregularities, followed by much "hard swearing" at the necessary inquiry. Also he translates many notices dealing with parochial matters, and some strangely interesting miscellaneous documents—an indulgence for listening to sermons, the denunciation of Nicholas Hereford and others as heretics, a "well-glossed" Bible borrowed by the Bishop of Winchester, and other like records.

This intermingling of public and private entries is characteristic of all medieval registers, in which little or no difference is made between the documents of personal and those of official interest. If a Bishop borrows money, to be repaid on a certain date, he enters a "reminder" in his register, often placing it between two official documents of the diocese: if he receives from the Papal Nuncio a receipt for Peter's Pence, that also is jotted down in the register.

Mr. Offer's two Introductions ("On Religious Houses" and "On the Medieval Bishop") are excellently done, and are full of most valuable information, alike to the ordinary reader and to the young student who desires to learn something of the administration of a medieval diocese and the methods of episcopal supervision. To both these classes of readers this book may be cordially recommended. A. T. BANNISTER.

LE CHRIST JÉSUS. Par M. Lepin, Professeur du Grand Séminaire de Lyon. Editeurs: Bloud et Gay, 3 Rue Garancière, Paris. 36 frs.

This book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the Christ-myth hypothesis, the second with the Messianic character of Jesus, and the third with His divinity.

In the first part the author deals with a book published in 1924 by M. Couchoud, called *Le Mystère de Jésus*, which attempts to revive the idea that Jesus never existed. The writer of this book was a pupil of Loisy, but cannot agree with his master in his estimate of the historic life of Jesus. It seems to him impossible that a man should have so soon come to be regarded as God with so little apparent cause, as the Modernist theory of the rise of Christianity supposes. He thinks that Jesus was a mystery divinity who was worshipped by a small circle of men in Palestine and who was supposed to appear in visions to them. Hence the statement in 1 Cor. xv. that Jesus was "seen of Cephas," etc. He holds that St. Paul adopted the cult of this divinity and added to it the idea that He had been put to death for the sake of men by Satan and his angels in some supramundane sphere. This he supports by translations of his own of Phil. ii. 5-11 and 1 Cor. ii. 6-8, and by taking a doubtful reading in the "Ascension of Isaiah" in a way that favours his theory. As some of the believers in this divinity were men of plain common sense, this sort of religion did not satisfy them, and so Mark wrote a "Gospel" in which he transformed this mythical being into a man who had lived in Galilee, died on the cross, and risen to a divine state. This theory is interesting, as it corresponds so exactly with the account that some Modernists give of the origin of the Fourth Gospel.

M. Lepin demolishes this absurd reconstruction of the history of Christianity with ease. He points out that M. Couchoud is driven to

formulate his theory because, as a follower of Kant, he cannot accept the idea of God becoming man, while, as a man of some discernment, he cannot accept the ordinary "critical" theory of the apotheosis of the man Jesus so soon after His death. In the other parts of his book M. Lepin takes Strauss, Renan, and Loisy as typical rationalists, and shows that their theory that the disciples saw visions of their Master so soon after His death presupposes the idea that He had claimed to be at least the Messiah. He also shows how they are all driven to admit that Jesus was original in a quite exceptional sense, and that His belief that He was the Son of God was innate in His "pure soul." Thus Renan says, "La conviction d'être de fils de Dieu était chez lui tellement profonde, qu'elle n'eut probabablement pas d'origine, et tenait aux racines mêmes de son être." And Loisy, "Dans l'humble demeure de Nazareth il avait grandi en fils de Dieu." M. Lepin gives an admirable summary of the evidence of the New Testament as to the Messianic character and divinity of our Lord, and the order in which this is set out is particularly clear and logical.

His method is first to present fully in the words of their authors the theories by which the rationalists have tried to account for the existence of the Church and the New Testament on the supposition that Jesus was no more than a man and that God is in no sense transcendent, but only the Spirit embodied in the Universe. He then shows how incompatible they are with the historic witness of Scripture and the known behaviour of men.

One of the most interesting features in his book is the way in which he shows that "Modernism" is not modern at all, but that all its favourite theories were propounded long ago by Strauss. In particular he shows that the idea that the incarnation of God in Jesus differs from that in other men in degree, but not in kind, was put forward by Strauss as a result of his Hegelian philosophy; and he traces back the opposition of the "Jesus of History" with the "Christ of Experience" to Spinoza.

The book leaves one with the impression more firmly implanted in the mind than ever that what is called "Modernism" does not rest on any new discoveries or on any "results" of historical criticism, but on the quasi-pantheistic theology with which its adherents start and on the excessive application of the theory of evolution which they all accept.

Strauss goes so far as to regard Jesus as the first of the pantheists, and thinks that the essence of His teaching was that God could be incarnate in all men as He was conscious that He was in Himself.

Thus every kind of "Thinker" who tries to rewrite the story of Jesus recreates Him in his own image.

The Liberal school presents Him in the likeness of a Lutheran pastor, and the Rationalist school and their successors, the Modernists, regard Him as either simply a man or as a man who first enunciated from His own experience the ideas of modern pantheism.

It is only the Catholic Church that presents Him as He has shown Himself to be, the Saviour of the world and the divine Son of God.

M. Lepin has done an excellent piece of work in which there is nothing assumed which depends on *a priori* reasoning about inspiration or the infallibility of the Church or the Pope. It is to be hoped that his book may be widely read in England and even translated, as there is no book in English with which we are acquainted which handles the question so clearly or so surely as his.

H. P. V. NUNN.

KANT'S CONCEPTION OF GOD. By F. E. England, M.A., Ph.D. Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

Theology has usually dismissed Kant's Metaphysic and turned rather to Ritschl with his denial that Theology has anything to do with Metaphysic. Accordingly, a competent and sympathetic study of what Kant taught about God was very much needed. This need Dr. England has most adequately supplied.

This study of *Kant's Conception of God*, commended by so thorough a student of Kant as Professor Dawes Hicks, is deserving of the highest praise. The book makes severe demands upon the attention, and assumes a general knowledge of the Kantian Metaphysic. But it deserves the careful reading that it demands. It is evidently the result of an intensive study of the whole of Kant's prolific writings, and also of the writings of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. And that was necessary for the task of tracing the development of Kant's thought from beginning to end. The *Nova Dilucidatio* (for the first time translated, and given in an appendix) shows, as Dr. England says, "that Kant was in a large part defending positions which later it became one of his chief objects to exhibit as untenable." Other positions, accepted mainly from Wolff, were also untenable, notably the conception of a static reality, but these, as Dr. England shows, Kant failed to reject, despite their inconsistency with his later thought. Encumbered thus to the last with pre-critical lumber, he was unable to take the further step which would have brought him to the firmer ground of personality.

What Kant considered to be impossible was not Theology as such, but a particular type of Theology, the contemporary dogmatic Theology. Theology, no less than Metaphysic, needed to take as "its point of departure the datum of experience, and not the logically possible." A critical Theology would be just as valid as a critical Metaphysic.

CYRIL H. VALENTINE.

CHRISTIAN IDEAS IN HISTORY. By C. E. Osborne. Murray. 10s. 6d.

The first Scott Holland lectures delivered were the remarkable set of Mr. R. H. Tawney, who furnished us with a contribution to the better understanding of the rise of capitalism in the sixteenth century. The second set is before us, and we think that the author will see how highly we value his philosophy of history when we say that we deliberately regard it as a worthy successor to the first. Now Canon Osborne is well known to all of us as the friend and the biographer of Father Dolling, and accordingly we expect him to be imbued with the ideas of one of the great priests of the Church of England. Nor is our expectation in the least disappointed. The author sets out to let us see the manifold manner in which Christian ideas have influenced the course of history. This is, of course, a very ambitious programme, and it is easy to say that Canon Osborne has not completely carried it out. Undoubtedly he has not, but has he carried it out in a thoroughly stimulating fashion? Here we have no hesitation in answering strongly in the affirmative, for he sets one thinking in many directions. Practically he begins with the origins of Christianity and he ends with our own day. We can do no more than single out some of the salient features of what he has so triumphantly accomplished. He is quite clear in tracing the outstanding position of

St. Augustine, though he is inclined to place Gregory the Great rather closer to him than we believe to be true. In spite of the author's powerful reasoning, we persist in holding that St. Augustine, not Gregory the Great, is the true father of the Middle Ages. Mediæval civilization the author surveys as undemocratic but unabsolutist, and there is much in this contention. At the same time we are fresh from another perusal of St. Thomas Aquinas's *De Regimine Principum*, and it decidedly leans to absolutist positions.

The transition to the modern State is analyzed with acuteness and with insight. Nothing could be better than the appreciation of John Calvin, and his bearing on the problems of our day is plainly indicated. In a chapter of notable worth Canon Osborne examines the rise and fall of mediæval internationalism, and then passes on to the amazing contribution made by Grotius and his successors. After this we come by swift steps to the Romantic and Christian Socialist movements, which are sympathetically examined. Such leaders of the latter as F. D. Maurice and Kingsley, Ludlow and Neale, are discussed with real grasp of the position they assumed. It is not difficult to trace the connection between the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the rise of the feeling for the brotherhood of man. Maurice in England, Erskine in Scotland, and Channing in the United States were all prophets of this doctrine, and the greatest of the three was Maurice. The author is perfectly right when he writes that Maurice rediscovered the social righteousness preached by the prophets. No one can lay down this volume without feeling deep gratitude to the author for the fruits of his seminal mind.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO JUDAS ISCARIOT. By Ernest Sutherland Bates. London: Heinemann. 7s. 6d. net.

According to the advertisement of this fantastic book, the author is a student of Early Christian philosophy. His metaphysics, however, appear to be the wildest nonsense, and the egregious blunder on p. 166, where the words of the Nicene Creed "by whom all things were made" are obviously regarded as having reference to the Father, not the Son, is sufficient to cast doubt upon the thoroughness of his studies. Except as illustrating the general chaos of belief and unbelief at the present time, the volume does not seem to us to be of value.

R. H. LIGHTFOOT.

PLAIN TALES FROM FLANDERS. By the Rev. P. B. Clayton, M.C. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

The pivot of this book is the original Toc H. of Poperinghe; that fact alone and the reputation of the author will ensure for it a wide reading. Nor will readers have cause for disappointment. The book has at least claims to distinction. In the first place, it is real literature, it contains some half-dozen stories which, regarded from the literary point of view alone, are of outstanding merit; there are also two good poems and an excellent Armistice Day sermon. Secondly, it is a valuable historical document, inasmuch as it recovers for us the impression originally made upon some of the best of our army chaplains by the spirit of the men of our armies in the war. If anyone doubts whether army chaplains had right or opportunity to form such opinions, let him read these true stories

before reaching a conclusion. Again, the reaction which followed the war led to an exaggerated depreciation of the genuine idealism which was a potent force in the minds of countless soldiers. Here we have no attempt to portray war as in itself glorious or noble, nor any revival of the feverish exaggeration of the heroic aspects of trench life against which there has been a revolt exemplified in one or two notable books of recent date. But, on the other hand, we are reminded that "Christ was in Flanders," not, indeed, as a partisan, but known and perceived by many, and by some for the first time. But it is as a story book of intrinsic value, full of human reality, with portraits of men who won and deserved the love of comrades, recording with pathos, with humour, with candour, and yet with reverent reserve, matters of historical fact, natural and supernatural, that this book will certainly earn its place in the literature of the war.

A. R. BROWNE-WILKINSON.

THE DECLINE OF THE WEST. By Oswald Spengler. Vol. II. Translated with notes by C. F. Atkinson. Allen and Unwin. 21s.

English readers are under a debt of gratitude to Mr. Atkinson for this admirable and readable translation, and to the publishers for its excellent print and paper.

There is much that was not clear or even understandable in the first volume which becomes clearer and more comprehensible by the study of this second volume.

Spengler tells us that we have been mistaken in supposing that there is a line of continuity running through the history of mankind on earth. Mankind does not exist, except as a term in zoology.

The only continuity is the continuity of a great culture which grows, blossoms, and dies *without fruit*; each culture is an isolated element comprising its own mathematics, science, art, etc.

Our Western culture will reach its destined end, to be followed by another—probably Russian—but this will *not* stand upon our shoulders. Borrow it may, but when it borrows it will transform what it takes into its own physiognomic style.

What, then, has Spengler to say of Christianity, which claims to break down the partitions between races and men, and which has records for two thousand years to appeal to to justify its claims?

Spengler's account of Christianity is, indeed, interesting and instructive. He claims to have unearthed from a "pseudomorphosis" an Arabian culture "midmost of the group of higher cultures, and the only one in point both of space and time in touch with practically all others." Christianity is only one of the many forms of the religion of the Magian Soul, which flourished from the beginning of our era under the disguise of Græco-Roman forms. But it did not pass into Western culture without great transformation.

"St. Augustine was the last great thinker of Early Arabian scholasticism—anything but a Western intellect."

Western Christianity is as much like Magian Christianity as the cupola buildings of the mosques are like the fine pointed spires of the Gothic cathedrals.

"Were Paul and Augustine to become acquainted with our ideas of Christianity, they would reject all our concepts as utterly erroneous and heretical."

It is in the light of this account of Christianity that it is possible for the student of the history of the Church to see the strong personal equation of Oswald Spengler, and to adjust his estimate to other parts of Spengler's work.

S. A. KING.

INSTITUTIONES BIBLICÆ, SCHOLIS ACCOMMODATÆ. Vol. II., Part III.: *De Libris Didacticis*. Auctore P. Alberto Vaccari, S.J. Romæ. 1929.

This is the third part of the second volume of a Biblical introduction by various authors now in course of publication in Rome. In the part before us, Fr. Vaccari, S.J., treats of the "Didactic Books"—that is to say, Psalms, Song of Songs, Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Job, Ecclesiastes, and Wisdom. After an opening chapter on the general characteristics of Hebrew poetry the author takes the books in the order given, dealing in each instance with date and authorship, the text, versions, and commentaries. An exegetical chapter is added at the end wherein special attention is given to Messianic and other remarkable Psalms, and containing a short but valuable treatise on the concept of Divine Wisdom as it appears in the books under review.

The treatment is learned and clear throughout, the appended bibliographies show that the author is familiar with a large number of the products of modern European scholarship. Many standard English works are quoted. The Latin in which the whole of the work is written seems quite admirably adapted to precise and lucid statement, both of facts and of the different critical hypotheses as they pass under review.

It will be understood, of course, that the exegetical part keeps strictly within the limits laid down by the Papal Biblical Commission. Thus, unless there are in any case grave reasons to the contrary, the traditional ascriptions of the Psalms to be found in the Hebrew and LXX texts are not to be called in question (Decree of May 1, 1910). Again, it must be maintained that certain Psalms are directly and literally prophetic and Messianic, and their statements are not to be referred to an imagined future of the people of Israel. David is the chief and principal author of the Psalms, and all but a comparative few must be ascribed to him personally, especially, *e.g.*, Psalm cx. (Vulgate, cix.).

On the other hand, where there is no constant or universal tradition, the author feels himself free to accept certain more modern critical conclusions—*e.g.*, the preface to Job is dramatic and allegorical; Solomon cannot be the author of Ecclesiastes. As regards the Song of Songs, however, some higher import must be sought than that which a merely literal reading has suggested to certain moderns; an allegory of God and His people is consistent with Old Testament usage, but a parabolic interpretation is to be preferred. A mystical, or even a Marian, interpretation is not, apparently, excluded. It is recognized that the revelation of a future life is progressive in the Old Testament. We reach only an imperfect doctrine, but one not in any way inconsistent with the fuller revelation that we have in Christ.

Altogether, this seems a good example of the more advanced Biblical studies of schools and colleges within the Roman Catholic communion.

W. R. V. BRADE.

A Brief Sketch of the Church of England. By G. K. A. Bell, D.D., Bishop of Chichester. S.C.M. 5s.

Has the Church Failed? By Kenneth Ingram Philip Allan. 5s.

These two volumes make an admirable complement and even foil to one another. The Bishop not only possesses a quite exceptional knowledge of the various aspects of the life of the Church of England, but is one of the best and most typical representatives of its central tradition. His interest is never merely antiquarian or official: he has a deep belief in the special mission of the Church, which has been strengthened by his close association with certain sides of the movement towards greater Christian unity. Though not a large book, it covers a wide field with remarkable success, and can be confidently recommended to all who wish for a better knowledge and understanding of the Church of England.

Mr. Ingram writes not from the centre, but from the Anglo-Catholic wing. He is at one with the Bishop of Chichester in believing that the Church of England ought to be a comprehensive Church, but, otherwise, the special genius of the Anglican tradition seems to make no great appeal to him. But it is in relation to the religious outlook as a whole, to the struggle between faith and unbelief, that his book is interesting and significant. Not many laymen or clerics would have been able to express with such lucidity and point the objections which the detached observer often feels to "the Churches" in respect both of their doctrines and of their moral teaching. Indeed, he never deals adequately, in the latter, more apologetic and constructive, part of the book with the particular difficulties stated in the opening chapters, and it is on these, rather than on the question of the tenableness of materialism, that one would have liked more of Mr. Ingram's own views. What he makes very clear is his aversion from rigidity in doctrinal forms and interpretations and from stress upon the necessity for institutional and liturgical uniformities. Thus, in the brief statement of his own belief, he writes: "I find that my conviction as to the essential need for unfettered liberty of thought is not fundamentally obstructed by Catholicism in its Anglo-Catholic form." Roman Catholicism seems to him to be committed to an anti-intellectual attitude of mind, while in Protestantism he finds an emphasis upon the emotions at the expense both of the intellect and of artistic excellence in worship. While always anxious to be fair, he has neither the sympathy nor the knowledge for any adequacy of judgment where Protestantism is concerned, even in respect of English Nonconformity.

But whether one agrees with him or not in his diagnoses, and in such a suggestion as that of a possible future "League of Independent Religions" as a help towards Christian unity, one will find his book both thoughtful and thought-provoking. People who do not like to be stirred up to face facts may not thank him for the first, the statistical, chapter, or for some other sections in his examination of the present position; but even these may, and others certainly will, profit from his pages.

J. K. Mozley.

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